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THE RHETORIC OF DISRESPECT:
UNCOVERING THE FAULTY PREMISES
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I. INTRODUGTION
The contemporary legal and popular "dialogue" about abortion is
unlikely to yield acceptable constitutional or public policy solutions.
The debate is too polarized, the positions too rigid, to admit any un-
derstanding or resolution. Despite the United States Supreme
Court's 1973 declaration that the choice to abort a pregnancy is a
constitutionally protected right,1 and the 1992 reaffirmation of that
basic right in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 reproductive choice re-
mains fragile.
Although Casey has stabilized the basic right of choice, access to
abortion services has become a problem of significant dimension to
many women purportedly endowed with the power to implement
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1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Several scholarly commentators have opined that Casey effectively
settled the issue of Roe v. Wades continued viability through its thorough and elegant exegesis
upon stare dedsis and its placement of the abortion issue in a strong "stream" ofbasic libertyju-
risprudence. Eg., jAmEs B. WHTe, Acts oF HOPE, 166-83 (1994) (discussing how Casey affirms
the right of a woman to have an abortion even though the Casey decision does not give Roe the
respect it deserves); David Garrow, Comments to Ohio Legal History Workshop, Ohio State
University (Jan. 26,1995).
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that liberty.3 The Supreme Court has been increasingly willing to
3. See generally BETsYHARTMANN, REPRODUGTIVE RIGHTSAND WRONGS 262 (1995) (noting
that today, one in five U.S. women seeking abortion cannot obtain one-because of nonfund-
ing, declining services, fewer providers, attacks on clinics and providers, and restrictive legisla-
tion such as burdensome informed consent requirements and waiting periods). The most re-
cent studies document that the number of abortions in 1992 was the lowest since 1979. Stanley
I. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United States, 1991 and 1992 26 FAM.
PLAN. PERsp. 100 (1994). The number of abortion providers decreases by 65 per year, leaving
2380 in 1992. Hospitals providing abortion services decreased by 18% between 1988 and 1992.
Id& at 100. Eighty-four percent of U.S. counties have no abortion provider, 92% have one pro-
viding more than 400 abortions a year;, 94% of nonmetropolitan counties have no provider, 33%
of metropolitan areas have either no abortion provider or one serving more than 50 women a
year. Id. at 103. Between 1988 and 1992, in Missouri, the state whose regulations were ap-
proved in Websterv. Reproductive Health Service, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), in 1989, abortions declined
29%. Id. Mississippi, which had three new providers between 1988 and 1992 had a 48% In-
crease in abortions in that period. However, since 1992, Mississippi's informed consent and
waiting period restrictions have resulted in fewer abortions than could otherwise be accounted
for by other causes. Frances A. Althause & Stanley K. Henshaw, The Effectds of Mandatory Delay
Laws on Abortion Patients &Prvides, 26 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 228 (1994). Henshaw and VanVort
conclude that "it seems unlikely that most of the decline in abortion levels is attributable to re-
duced numbers of unintended pregnancies." Henshaw & Van Vort, supra at 106. Similarly, the
public attitude toward abortions, which has been fairly stable over time, and the public attitude
toward unwed childbirth, which seems to be getting more tolerant, may partially account for the
decreasing number of unintended pregnancies. The accessibility of abortion services, however,
seems to account for a significant part of the decrease. Henshaw & Van Vort, supra at 106, 112.
The primary barriers to accessibility, discounting regulations like waiting periods, appear to be
distance (27% of abortion patients travel more than 50 miles; 1/3 of these more than 100
miles); cost (costs vary significantly depending upon the nature of the provider, i.e. specialized
clinic, private physician, hospital, and weeks of gestation, with the 10 week gestation abortion
costing $245 on average in a specialty clinic and $1757 in a hospital outpatient facility, other
costs such as transportation, lodging and medical supplies and services afterwards must also be
considered); harassment (a 1985 survey by the Alan Guttmacher Institute found that 61% of
nonhospital facilities and 88% of facilities that provided more than 400 abortions had experi-
enced harassment; the highest percentage of harassment occurring in the Midwest); length of
gestation (after 10 weeks and especially in the second trimester, many providers do not offer
abortion services); HIV-status (many providers have not and some will not accept patients who
are HIV-positive). Henshaw concludes that "these barriers may now be insurmountable to more
women than was the case a decade ago." Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility ofAbortion Services
in the United States, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSp. 246, 252 (1991). Coupled with increasing legal restric-
tions, such as gag rules and waiting periods, the number of women facing insurmountable barri-
ers is likely to increase. Id. at 252.
The rhetoric of "choice" as rhetoric for availability without provisions for access has also en-
abled others to use "choice" to support laws and policies that restrict women's access to abortion
services. For instance, arguments restricting doctors from learning abortion techniques, terror-
ism restricting doctors from performing abortions, and the "choices" of "states" and "taxpayers"
not to permit abortions in publicly supported hospitals (some coupled with laws requiring doc-
tors to perform certain abortions only in hospitals) are examples of perversions of choice argu-
ments. Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-203 (1991) (upholding "gag" rules that prohibit
advising women of the abortion option as not interfering with choice or availability, despite
their access implications).
In comparison to the United States, some foreign countries, such as Canada, must have a uni-
tary policy toward abortion because all women have the same access and funding support. In
Canada, this has led to less dialogue and fewer restrictive laws. Ruth Colker attributes this to
the fact that in the United States funding laws can ignore women's interest due to their de-
creased political power and voice,.a phenomenon not possible in Canada. Ruth Colker, Abortion
andDialogue 63 TM L. REV. 1363, 1389 (1989) (noting that poor women in the United States,
even if able to choose to have an abortion, often cannot actually have the abortion because of
the prohibitive cost).
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support legal restrictions that restrict access to abortion services. 4 In
addition, murder and violence are being leveled at abortion provid-
ers, their clinics, and their families.
5
The polarized, vituperative and pervasive nature of our society's
current political debate about abortion is relatively recent.6 The ex-
plosion of emotion and allegations of bad faith which characterize
the extreme rhetoric are a contrast to the historical treatment of the
question of abortion.7 Our society's treatment of the abortion ques-
tion is paradoxical. Women have aborted pregnancies in every time
and every culture. 8 Women have also been overwhelmingly respon-
4. Compare Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (striking down several abortion requirements) and Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down requirements such as informed consent,
parental consent, and a 24-hour waiting period) uf'th Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding in-
formed consent, parental consent, and a 24-hour waiting period) and Webster, 492 U.S. 490
(upholding state prohibitions on the use of public employees or funds to perform or assist in
abortions not necessary to save the life of the mother).
5. Timothy Egan, s Abortion Violence a Plot? Conspiracy Is Not Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 1995, at 1 (noting the increase of arson and murders in abortion clinics since 1992); As the
Teroism Escalates, the Po-Choice Strugg-e Continues, Ms., May/June 1995, at 42, 43 (discussing the
increasing violence against abortion clinics and providers, and efforts to stop it); Katie Monagle,
How We Got Here, Ms., May/June 1995, at 54, 56-57 (detailing the harassment and violence of
anti-choice activists); Strategizing: Where Do We Go From Here?, MS., May/June 1995, at 58
(reporting a roundtable discussion about barriers to procreative choices, especially abortion.
Participants included Byllye Avery, founder of the National Black Women's Health Project; Mi-
chael Hershman of Fairfax Group, Ltd., which deals with security issues; BrendaJoyner, director
of the Feminist Women's Health Center in Tallahassee, Florida; Jennie Lifrie-i Ries, a clinic
defender in Dobbs Ferry, NewYork; Eleanor Smeal, president of the Feminist Majority Founda-
tion; and MarciaAnn Gillespie, editor-in-chief of MS.)
6. See generallyJAiES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMIUCk THE ORIGINS AND EVALUATION OF
NATIONALPOLIC, 1800-1900 (1978).
7. Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559,1573-74 (1991) [hereinafterJ. Williams, Gender Wars] (noting the change from the 1800's,
when abortion was legal, providers ofabortion openlyadvertised their services, and abortion did
not create the moral dilemma it does now, to the 1990's).
8. "Anthropologists remind us that every known culture, whether literate or preliterate,
primitive or modem, has engaged in [abortion]." PATRICK SHEERAN, WOMEN, SocT', THE
STATE, AND ABORTION 49 (1987) (quoting DAVID MALL, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE: ABORTION AND
MORAL NECESSrIY 1 (1983)). See HARTMANN, supra note 3, at 259 (explaining how, in most so-
deties, abortion has been used for centuries as a common method of birth control and was tol-
erated implicitly, if not expressly, by social custom and law). Sheeran points out that histori-
cally, those who condemn abortion have been men, whereas women have been more likely to
accept it. SHEERAN, supra at 51. See also Leigh Mintum, The Birth Ceremony as a Right of Passage
Into Infant Personhood, in ABORTION RIGHTS AND FERAL "PERSONHOOD" 87 (Edd Doerr & James
Prescott eds., 1989). The 19th century laws outlawing abortion were passed by male legislatures
elected by male-only voters influenced by male physicians. See BarbaraJ. Cox, RefocusingAbortion
Jurisprudence to Include the Woman: A Response to Bopp and Coleson and Webster v. Reprductive Health
Svices, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 543, 561, nn.109 and 114 (1990). Contrary to some popular views,
there is no direct connection between a society's views on abortion and its general respect for
human life. Stephen J. Schnably, NormativeJudgment, Social Change, and Legal Reasoning in the
Context of Abortion and Privacy, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 715, 742-43 (1985) (citing the
abortion laws of Nazi Germany as an example of the lack of an inherent connection between
views on abortion and respect for human life).
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sible for the care and nurture of children, physically, emotionally
and spiritually. 9 In the United States, no one questions the State's
lack of power to forbid women from childbearing or to coerce abor-
tion.10 But a woman's choice not to bear a child has led to demands
for State control and prohibition.
This article documents my search to understand the fragility of re-
productive rights. That fragility cannot be explained by characteriz-
ing Roe and its progeny as baseless, unreasoned and/or unprincipled
legal decisions. 11 As this article demonstrates, the fragility is ex-
plained by two reasons. First, the unexamined premises in the legal
building blocks of reproductive rights reflect an attitude of disre-
spect for and mistrust of women and of their moral capacity to make
difficult decisions. These premises have been incorporated into case
law and the public discourse concerning reproductive rights, un-
dermining any granting to women of a power to choose. Second,
the Court and the public consistently fail to put abortion into the
context of procreation when considering the proper roles of indi-
viduals and the State with respect to procreative decisions. This fail-
ure distorts the question of procreative choice and obstructs our
thinking about the State's role within it.
Until approximately the mid-nineteenth century, both the com-
mon law and society in general treated first trimester abortions
9. Catharine MacKinnon, Refltions on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1312
(1991); see Catherine Hantzis, Is G-nderJustice a Completed Agenda?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 690, 694,
701 (1987) (book review) (noting that despite increasing numbers of fathers who care for their
children, it remains primarily the women's responsibility); Reva Siegel, ReasoningFrom the Body:
A HstoricalPeripective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261,
375-76 (1992) (noting that women are expected to give up their personal interests to take cire
of their children, while men are not); see also MARYANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN
WESTERN LAW 117-18 (1987) (explaining how our country's founders counted on women to
transmit values in the home setting).
10. Accord Siegel, supra note 9, at 356, 361 (noting that early legislators would not have en-
acted any law that prevents a woman from having a child-and in fact enacted laws that crimi-
nalized abortion and contraceptives-partly due to the belief that a woman's primary sodal
function and role was that of motherhood, or as "child-rearer").
11. Thejoint opinion ofJustices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter in Casey, 505 U.S. at 843,
makes it clear that Roe's fundamental thrust recognizing the right to choose is powerful and last-
ing. Id. at 846. See also WHITE, supra note 2, at 168-80 (explaining how thejoint opinion sup.
ports Roe more because of Rea's own merits than for the sake of stare dedss although stare decisis
also plays a vital role in the opinion).
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(before "quickening") as relatively unproblematic.12 The successful
movement to criminalize abortion in the United States in the late
nineteenth century has been attributed to several converging fac-
tors.1 3 One scholar notes that the Industrial Revolution resulted in
the creation of sex roles which identified middle-class women with
the "sphere of domesticity," which included the private enclave of
home, reproduction, and childrearing. 14 Actions deemed inconsis-
tent with the nurturing virtues of such domesticity included control
of fertility, and therefore, the practice of abortion.15 Another
scholar has documented the importance of the emergence of the
medical profession, which sought to consolidate its power over
health care delivery.1 6 Home care, including abortion, was fre-
quently provided by nonphysicians, and the American Medical Asso-
ciation ("AMA:) used the outlawing of abortion to eliminate their
12. SaJ. Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 7, at 1573 (explaining that quickening normally
occurs late in the fourth or early in the fifth month of pregnancy). Up until 1800, no state had
a law outlawing abortion. Instead, states followed the common law, which permitted abortion
prior to quickening of the fetus. Even states which outawed abortion after quickening did not
penalize abortion as harshly as they penalized homicide. Many jurisdictions did not punish a
pregnant woman who obtained an abortion, but only the person who performed it. MOHR, SU-
pra note 6, at 3-4, 265; SHEERAN, supra note 8, at 53. The distinction between the moral and
legal implications of ending embryonic fetal life versus the moral and legal implications of tak-
ing the life of a born person continues to exist. See Schnably, supra note 8, at 733-34 n.55
(discussing different views on issuing criminal penalties for abortion). Indeed, many propo-
nents of the view that abortion is murder would not punish it as murder, signaling a belief that
there is a difference between the two. Se RONALD DWORMIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 13-14 (1993)
(citing several polls on these beliefs); Id. at 20-22 (noting the distinction between the rhetoric
of "murder" and the equation offetal life with born life); Edward A. Langerak, Abortion: Listening
to the Middle, 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1979, at 24 (claiming inconsistencies in extreme
positions for and against abortion, and urging the moderate beliefs, which seem fhirly widely
held, that moral problems increase as the fetus approaches live birth); Minturn, supra note 8, at
87 (explaining historical distinctions between abortion and murder); Lynn Morgan, When Does
Lfe Begin, in ABORTION RIGHTS AND FETAL "PERSONHOOD" 99 (Ed Doerr &James Prescott eds.,
1989) (detailing cultural actions which display the belief that abortion and murder are differ-
ent).
13. See generally MOHIR, supra note 6, at 20-45 (discussing how the first wave of abortion leg-
islation, between 1821 and 1841, was due to legislators' and physicians' desire to control the
practice of medicine, rather than from public attitudes toward abortion); SHEERAN, supra note
8, at 55-58 (explaining the historical progression of abortion laws in the United States and Eng-
land in the 1800's and 1900's).
14. J.1 Williams, Gender Wars, supranote 7.
15. J. Wlliams, Gender Wars, supra note 7, at 1564-73, 1581-84; Siegel, supra note 9, at 321
(noting that lawmakers defined a woman's role as "Wife" with reference to her obligation to bear
children).
16. MOHR, supra note 6, at 148-70 (explaining how physicians' outspokenness against abor-
tion led to public intolerance of abortion and influenced restrictive abortion laws).
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competition. 17 Another scholar discusses the impact of the eugenics
and nativism movements on the issue. 18 Opposition to genetic
"undesirables" procreating coalesced with the fear that using abor-
tion to decrease the fertility of native-born, white, middle-class
women, but not to decrease the concomitant high fertility rates
among immigrant populations, would threaten the character of the
country.19 By the late nineteenth century, restrictive abortion laws
were the norm.20 At no point, however, was abortion ever treated as
equivalent to murder, or punished with similar severity.2 1 In the
mid-twentieth century, liberalized abortion laws, supported by the
AMA and usually following the lead of the Model Penal Code, were
becoming the new norm.22
Roe v. Wad 3 in January 1978 marked the United States Supreme
Court's entry into the issue. Relying on past decisions which held
that personal control is a fundamental right in decisions affecting
one's body, home, family, marital relationship, and interest in re-
productive control (to procreate and to use contraception) free from
17. See MOHR, supra note 6, at 145-70 (noting that the AMA used its claim to superior scien-
tific expertise to claim a moral high ground in opposition to abortion and detailing the physi-
cians' crusade against abortion). See also SHEERAN, supra note 8, at 5358 (noting that prohibi-
tion of abortion increased as a result of the physicians' campaign); JOYCE GELB & MARIAN LIEF
PALLEY, WoMENAND PuLBucPoucIs, 129-31 (1982) (explaining that certain physicians pushed
for restrictive legislation to wipe out competition from less qualified doctors who were threaten-
ing their practices by advertising their willingness to perform abortions); Siegel, supra note 9, at
280-319 (explaining how doctors used scientific reasoning to discount a woman's role in repro-
duction); Thomas A. Shannon, Abortion. A Challenge forEthics and Public Poly, in ABORTION AND
THE STATUS OF THE FE"us 3, 3-4 (William Bondeson, Tristram H. Englebardt, Jr., Stuart F.
Spicker, & David H. Winship eds., 1983) (noting that early abortion legislation was written to
protect the mother and not out of concern for the fetus). But seeWarren M. Hem, ThePolitics of
Choice2 Abortion as nsunection, in BIRTHS AND POWER 127, 1334 (W. Penn Handwerker, ed.,
1990) (noting that some of the medical reasoning behind pushing for restrictive abortion laws
was in response to women's health, as abortion had become more dangerous for some women
than childbirth).
18. Linda Gordon, Wy Nineteenth Century.Feminists Did Not Support "Birth Control" and Twenti-
eth CentuiyFeministsDo:FeminiM, Repfroduction, and theFamily, in RETHINKING THE FAiELY 40, 142-
44 (Barrie Thome with Marilyn Yalom, eds., 2d ed. 1982).
19. Id. at 42-44 (explaining that nineteenth century women's rights advocates sought
greater respect for motherhood). See Shannon, supra note 17, at 3 (noting that white Anglo-
Saxon Protestants would be outnumbered by immigrants if greater numbers of white women
underwent abortions); GEMB & PALLEY, supra note 17, at 129-31; Siegel, supra note 9, at 297-300.
20. MOHR, supranote 6, at 171, 226.
21. SHEERAN, supra note 8, at 54-55; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text; authorities
cited supra note 12.
22. SeeSHEERAN, supra note 8, at 57-58 (noting that the AMA's anti-abortion campaign led
to the criminalization of abortion); J. Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 7, at 1575-76; Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 142-49 (1973) (discussing the positions of the AMA and the American Bar
Association on abortion).
23. 410 U.S. 118 (1973).
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governmental mandate,24 the Supreme Court determined that a
woman's liberty interest in reproductive control by terminating a
pregnancy was protected within the right of privacy.25 Since Roe v.
Wade, legislative and popular efforts to restrict the availability of
abortion have persisted. The Court conceded the legislative power
to refuse to fund abortions in 1977 and 1980.26 Until 1989, however,
the Supreme Court steadfastly resisted the direct assaults upon
women's choice against all but a few legislative initiatives.2 7 With
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,28 however, the Court began to
allow restrictive legislation to survive constitutional attack. This new
approach culminated with Planned Parenthood v. Casey29 in 1992,
which upheld restrictions the Court had struck down in Thorn-
burgh.3 0 What emerged was a stl-recognized but diminished right of
a woman to choose abortion, a right which frequently paled in com-
parison to an increasingly valued state interest in preserving fetal life.
Coupled with the growing practical unavailability of abortion serv-
ices, Casey creates concern that women's procreative choices will in-
creasingly be reduced.
The full-scale battle for the "hearts and minds" of the American
public continues at a fever pitch. Fought in homes, outside clinics,
in the media, in academic writings, in the halls of administrative
agencies, in legislatures, and in the courts, the war has created a lot
24. Id at 152-53 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54
(1972) (contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relation-
ships); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and education);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (child rearing and education)).
25. 'The right of privacy ... founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
26. Maherv. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,480 (1977); Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980).
27. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (allowing reporting of
the abortion, recordkeeping of the woman's health, and requiring informed consent of the pa-
tient) with Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) (striking down legislation subjecting awoman to a detailed anatomical description of the
fetus at two week gestational increments from fertilization to full term, and requiring her to
contact agencies supportive of carrying the child to term before getting an abortion).
28. 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding the prohibition of the use of public employees, funds,
and facilities for the purpose of performing, aiding, encouraging, or counseling a woman to
have an abortion not necessary to save her life).
29. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
30. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
Thonrburgh struck down legislation that required a woman to hear an anatomical description of
the fetus at two week gestational increments. Casey, however, overruled Tornurgh on this point
and upheld informed consent provisions that required an abortion provider to give a woman
truthful, non-misleading information about the nature of an abortion procedure, health risks
related to abortion as well as childbirth, and the gestational age of the fetus. Casey, 505 U.S. at
882.
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of debris.31 A great deal of the debris is attributable to the legal
framework from which abortion rights arose and in which procrea-
tive choice and state control are analyzed. This legal framework is
riddled with too much disrespect for women to form a promising
foundation for legal solutions.3 2 We need a new paradigm. That
paradigm must repudiate the vision of women35 that society has con-
structed and the law has internalized. It must be a model for deci-
sionmaking reflective of the human truths of procreation and re-
spectful of the moral dimensions of the decision to transmit life to
another.
There are a few positive effects of this conflagration. This fury has
made us aware; it has made us think; it has made us care. Emotion
as well as reason has a necessary place in human decisionmaking,
and thus, by definition, in moraljudgment. 3 4 I am optimistic that if
we clear out the debris, accord each other the human decency of
trusting the good faith and moral integrity of those with whom we
disagree,3 5 and become willing to accept the burdens and rewards
of mutual social responsibility for supporting the moral life of indi-
viduals and the physical life of all of us, we can address the social
problem this debate has become with reason as well as with concern.
31. Accord Siegel, supra note 9, at 278 (noting that the Court in Roe did not have available
all the resources in 1972 which are now available that detail the history of the nineteenth cen-
tury campaign to criminalize abortion. Siegel then reexamines the decision in light of the his-
torical reasons for the campaign, which the Court overlooked.).
32. One problem is our society's failure to come to grips with the inequality inherent in
state control over female fertility. Respect and equality are both tied to compassion - the under-
standing of another's life conditions as they are. Without this respect and compassion for the
persons and interests "behind" a right, "a system of rights is unlikely to be very effective." Ruth
Colker, Fminism, Theology, and Abortion" Toward Love, Compassio and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. 1 EV.
1011, 1027 (1989) (citing Andreas Teuber, Simone Wei" Equality as Compassion, 43 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 221, 235-36 (1982)). A "robust respect for rights" is a precondition to
both liberty and the exercise of responsibility by individuals. Robin West, The Supreme Court 1989
Term'Forward: TakingFreedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43,79 (1990).
33. The vision which needs to be repudiated is not a vision of women fulfilling the critically
important role of motherhood with dignity and morality. The vision in need of repudiation is
the vision that women have no moral agency (at least not apart from their mothering duties)
and do not deserve respect for their ability to make moral decisions, both within and outside of
the context of procreation.
34. For an eloquent defense of the role of emotion in moral decisionmaking, see Sidney
Callahan, The Role of Emotion in Ethical Deciionmaking 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 9 (June/July
1988). See also NEL NODDINGS, CARIG: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDU-
CArION 25-35 (1984) (arguing that problem-solving in ethical situations requires moving be-
tween the analytic/rational and receptive/caring-feeling modes, with awareness of the complex-
ity of the issue addressed).
35. I must draw an important exception to those few anti-choice believers who also partici-
pate in and condone violence, from murder to harassment, as a method of "expression."
One author defines "good faith" in abortion as requiring pro-lifers to respect women's well-
being and pro-choicers to respect the value of prenatal life. Colker, supra note 3, at 1363 n.1.
With such a basis, fruitful dialogue becomes possible.
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Our disagreements about the nature of fetal life and the moral
consequences of its termination are inescapable.8 6 Those who be-
lieve that fetal life is the moral and physical equivalent of born life
and that abortion is murder will probably never convince those who
believe that fetal life differs fundamentally both morally and physi-
cally from the life of a born person. But my sense is that the vast ma-
jority of us share a reverence for life37 and a belief that we are moral
agents with a profound moral responsibility for life. I think most of
us believe procreation should be engaged in with love and moral se-
riousness. And I believe that most of us see a profound difference
between government edict and love and morality.
It is both primary and inescapable that procreation requires moral
decisionmaking.3 8 My sense is that the vast majority of us want peo-
ple to make the most moral and best decisions they can about beget-
ting, bearing, and raising our children. We want every child to be
loved, cared for and raised to be a happy, good human being and
productive citizen.3 9 I daresay that most of us would believe we lived
36. Although not nearly as furious and popularly engaged in as in the United States today,
debates about abortion have persisted throughout human history. "Morally, the question of
whether or not the fetus was 'alive' had been the subject of philosophical and religious debate
amongst honest people for at least 5,000 years." SHEERAN, supra note 8, at 51 (quoting MOHR,
supra note 6, at 4). See also Roger Wertheimer, Undztanding the Abortion Argument, in THE
RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION 23 (1arshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, & Thomas Scanlon
eds., 1974) (explaining the many different arguments for and against abortion); Laurence
Thomas, Aborion , Savaey, and the Law: A Study in Moral Character, in ABORTION: MORAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECriV.S 227, 228 (Jay Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) (arguing that the
anti-abortionist view that pro-choice people are of low moral character, and their comparison of
pro-choice people to slaveowners, is filse); Schnably, supra note 8, at 727-48 (discussing differ-
ent approaches in determining when a fetus is a person); Mary C. Segers, Can Congres Settle the
Abortion Issue HASTINGS CENTER REP.,June 1982, at 20, 22-24, 26 (discussing the constitutional
and political problems Congress would create if it passed a law declaring that life begins at con-
ception).
37. Ronald Dworkin claims that the disputants in the debates over abortion and euthanasia
both share a common reverence for the sacredness of human life, but disagree upon the best
means for expressing that reverence and protecting the value of life. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at
84-89,100-01.
38. Accord MOHR, supra note 6, at 4; SHEERAN, supra note 8, at 51; Siegel, supra note 9, at
327 (noting a Los Angeles Times survey that equated abortion with immorality) (citing George
Skelton, Most Americans Think Abortion is Immora4 L.A. TIMziES, Mar. 19, 1989, at Al); CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORYAND WOMEN'S DEVELOPNMr 64-105
(1982) (examining the types of moral reasoning women go through when determining whether
to terminate a pregnancy).
39. Cf Siegel, supra note 9, at 371-72 (explaining that most women would find it more dii-
cult to give a child up for adoption than to have an abortion because once the child is born, a
woman will form strong emotional bonds with the child. These bonds, combined with familial
and social pressure, will obligate her to raise the child.). Siegel also notes that forcing a woman
to bear and rear a child (by prohibiting abortion) affects her ability to plan her life and career.
Siegel, supra note 9, at 373. These factors may affect the child's happiness and quality of life.
Siegel, supra note 9, at 37--74 nn.441-43. Siegel also explains that motherhood "forced" on a
woman because of restrictive abortion laws may lead her and her children to live in poverty.
Siegel, supra note 9, at 377.
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in a reproductive utopia if every sex act were truly mutually consen-
sual and engaged in with mature respect for self and partner, every
pregnancy were a blessing, abortion could be rare or nonexistent,
and every child had a happy, loving home with emotional, physical,
spiritual and financial nurturance and security. But this is not the
world in which we live, and it cannot be the world for which our le-
gal, social, political and moral solutions are designed.
This article attempts to expose and clear away the debris which the
law has contributed to our national struggle. Part II analyzes the Su-
preme Court's view of women and brings to light unacceptable
premises about women's moral capacities and reproductive roles
which have contaminated public belief and debate. Part HI focuses
upon the privacy cases to reveal the premises they have adopted.
Those premises are dissonant with any intended protections of
moral judgment or reservation of decisionmaking power to women.
By incorporating these premises, the law of abortion rights has
imbedded within itself a conflict with women and disrespect for
women's moral judgments. The Conclusion suggests how the unac-
ceptable premises of Supreme Court jurisprudence have contami-
nated the abortion cases, and led to the current impasse. The faulty
premises that have perverted legal analysis must be changed for con-
structive movement to occur.
With the defective premises exposed, we can reevaluate abortion
jurisprudence. The pernicious effects of such unexamined premises
can then be understood and repudiated. We can seek and incorpo-
rate more helpful and viable premises. With this larger task in mind,
I have taken the first steps toward a new premise in this article.
Let us respect our differences and accept the responsibility inher-
ent in our common ground.
II. THE PREMISES OF DISRESPECT: THE IMAGE OF WOMEN IN SUPREME
COURT CASES
A. Introduction
In seeking to unravel our cultural assumptions about procreation,
women, and morality, I have concentrated on Supreme Court opin-
ions which deal with those, often intersecting, matters. I have exam-
ined the Court's rhetoric and assumptions, as well as its actions and
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rulings, to reveal how our culture has viewed abortion.40 Through
this exploration, I have identified a cultural belief system about
women that helps explain the current morass in regard to procrea-
tive choice and government control over it.
My thesis is simple: the United States Supreme Court has consis-
tently viewed women through their reproductive capacity.41 Women
40. A critical insight, which post-modem theorists have revitalized, is that language and
discourse are constitutive of law and society. Eg., Sherry F. Colb, Words That Deny, Devalue, and
PunishJudidalResponses to Feus-Envy, 72 B.U. L. REV. 101, 104-05 (1992) (noting that legal ac-
tors translate rhetoric into law); ZILAH EISENSTEI, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE IAW 21-22
(1988) (proposing that phallocratic discourse and language define the law, reality, and the fe-
male body); MARYJO FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM x, xix, xxix, 125-31 (1992) (arguing
that legal rules, language, and discourse determine the meaning of the female body); J. Wfil-
liams, Gender Wars, supra note 7, at 1561 (noting that society views a woman as "selfish" if she
puts her needs above the needs of her children).
Human myth makers have known of this important role of language and discourse for centu-
ries, and modem anthropologists document the impact of myth on culture and social structure.
See, e.g., JOSEPH AIQPBELL & BILL MOYERS, THE POWVER OF MYrH 8 (1988) (explaining how
myths teach us to be members of our society). Id. at 9 (discussing how myths in a homogeneous
society are more readily constructed and understood than in a society of persons from different
backgrounds). In such societies, law replaces the ethos that myth provides.). Id. at 13
(proposing that myths offer life models). Id. at 32 (proclaiming that myths deal with "the matu-
ration of the individual" ... and ... "how to relate to this society and how to relate this society to
the world of nature and the cosmos").
The United States is a highly pluralistic society that does not have the shared heritage of myth
common in smaller, less complex, and more importantly, homogeneous cultures. Myth, how-
ever, binds peoples together in irreplaceable ways. We need myths to represent our shared
past, present and future.
Our culture's creation myth is the Constitution, and our Supreme Court decisions are the
myth of our social structure. For instance, note the reverential attitudes and language reserved
for the "Framers" and "Founders" in our cultural and constitutional discourse. As one of my
Constitutional Law students remarked to me one day, we treat them as secular "gods" and their
words as the "Word." The Biblical nature of constitutional exegesis bears out how importantly it
is constitutive of our culture as well as of our law. Cf.Joan Wiiliams, Abortion, Incommensurabilty,
and Jurisprudea, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1651, 1655 (1989) (citing MICHAEL PERRY, MORALrM,
POLITICS, AND LsW 140 (1988)), who argues that constitutional adjudication is the "moral dis-
course of the constitutional community," and charges judges with developing a "prophetic"
meaning). Thus the unspoken premises, the accepted beliefs, the very discourse of Supreme
Court jurisprudence-especially constitutional jurisprudence-reflect our cultural code and
world view, as much as they embody our law.
41. "[Within law, women are treated in four ways: as a sex class, as different from men-
reproducers and gendered mothers; as the same as men, like men, and therefore not women; as
absent but as a class different from men; and as absent but as a class the same as men."
EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 55. What is consistent is the use of maleness as the center of each
view and as descriptive of "normalcy." EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 55, 69. Women's reproduc-
tive capacity, differing from men's, has been identified as "other," and in that alien form,
viewed with much misunderstanding. EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 102-05. See also Siegel, supra
note 9, at 265, 267-68, 331-35 (explaining that social discourse about women's roles has con-
verged with discourse about women's bodies. Siegel discusses how this convergence has influ-
enced legislation and court decisions. Beginning with Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908),
the Supreme Courtjustified social and labor laws restricting women by looking at their bodies
and their reproductive and childbearing functions. In Mulla, the Court upheld a state law that
prohibited females from working more than ten hours a day because their "physical structure"
puts them at a disadvantage and because the physical well-being of women is in the public in-
terest because women are responsible for bearing healthy babies.).
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have been subsumed into their reproductive organs. The woman as
an independent person with interests and needs is invisible in the
Court's decisions: instead, law has treated women first and foremost
as potential or actual mothers. Concomitantly, law has failed to rec-
ognize women as moral agents, capable of making trustworthy deci-
sions in complex situations.4 2
Female reproductive capacity gives women an exclusive experi-
ence.43 Women's reproductive capacity has been used to identify
them not only as different from, but inferior to men.44 Women's
supposed inferiority encompasses physical, emotional, intellectual
and moral capacities. 45 Because they are different, women have
been relegated to a separate sphere of activity, identified with their
42. See Siegel, supra note 9, at 340 ("Concern for a woman's existing or potential offspring
historically has been the excuse for denying women equal employment opportunities") (citing
U.A.W. v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991)); Bradwell v. Illinois, 80 U.S. 130,
139, 140-41 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (reasoning that because a woman's "paramount
destiny and mission" is to be a wife and mother with no legal identity apart from her husband,
who can not make legally binding contracts without her husband's consent, she is incompetent
to have a separate career); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 785, 801 (1986) (White,J., dissenting) (noting that the majority erred in assuming
that receiving certain information about the abortion procedure would increase a woman's
anxiety and affect her ability to make a decision); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-203 (1991)
(holding that a "gag rule" prohibiting physicians in federally funded agencies from discussing
abortion as an option with pregnant women was not a constitutional invasion, but consistent
with a State power to encourage childbirth, apparently believing that mere awareness of the
option to abortwould lead women to choose it).
43. See Colb, supra note 40, at 106 (noting that science and nature rhetoric degrades a
woman's reproductive capability).
44. Colb, supra note 40, at 116-17 (explaining that because men do not share women's abil-
ity to gestate, the role of gestation in reproduction is ignored or diminished in judicial rhetoric.
Pregnancy, therefore, is devalued and turned into a basis for devaluing women themselves as
inferior to men and/or unsuited to "male" arenas, such as the workplace.). SeeEISENSTEIN, su-
pra note 40, at 32-33 (explaining that the process of establishing difference based upon repro-
ductive capacity and then choosing one set of characteristics and denominating it as "normal"
or superior is the core of patriarchy). David A.J. Richards, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Consti-
tutional Law: Prolegomenon to a Theory of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 51 LAW & CONTIP.
PRoBs. 123, 125 (1988) (noting that women, being identified with fanily life, were considered
to be part of a morally inferior class whose work in the family was important only because it
"released men for public life").
45. Vast amounts of literature have exposed and supported this effect of identifyingwomen
as "different from" men, and then associating the difference as inferiority. See generally Ca-
tharine MacKinnon, Difference andDominance: On Sex Dcrimination, inFEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32
(1987); Christine A. Littleton, Restrcturing SexualEqualiy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword."ustice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987);
Joan Wflliams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. RLrV. 797 (1989) [hereinafterj. Williams, Decon-
stncting Gender]; Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feml -
nism, in FEMNIST LEGAL TI-MORY 15,22-25 (Katherine Bartlett & Roseann Kennedy eds., 1991)
[hereinafterW. Williams, quality Crisis]; Deborah L Rhode, Feminist Critical Theorde, 42 SrAN. L.
REV. 617 (1990); Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan
and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15VT. L. REV. 1 (1990); Ann Scales, Th Emergmc of Feministfuris-
prudence..AnF~ssay, 95YALEL.J. 1373 (1986); GILLIGAN, supra note 38; AlisonJaggar, SexualDiffcr-
ence and Sexual Eulifty, in LIVING W1rT- CONTRADICTIONS: CONTROVERSIES IN FEMINIST SOCIAL
ETMCS 18 (AlsonJaggar ed., 1994); EISENSrEIN, supra note 40.
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role in reproduction: women are mothers, domestics, and in need of
protection.46
Two attitudes emerged from this cosmology. First, the denizens of
the domestic sphere had lesser capacities and were deserving of less
respect for themselves and their life views.47 Second, this distinct
world appeared unknowable to those excluded from its initiation
rite-pregnancy and childbirth. As unknowable, it became mystic
and mysterious, separate in a cosmic way. Both of these attitudes
were instrumental in the development of law as it related to women
in general and to women in their reproductive roles.
Reducing women to their reproductive roles distorted the way that
law dealt with them. Such distortions were inherent aspects of the
46. This view of the world and womanhood is markedly urban, industrial, middle-class, het-
erosexual, and (probably) white. As my colleague Richard Aynes and other scholars have
pointed out, the "cult" of domesticity was a luxury which the rural, poor, and working classes
had no real access to in practice, although they may have been confined by it in theory. See
DEBORAH RHODE, THEOREICAL PERSPE CTES ON SEXUAL DInRENCE, 1-9, 204-07 (1990)
(noting that male-imposed difference between men and women has disadvantaged women. As
an example, Rhode discusses how social conventions confined women to tedious, low status, and
low-paying work.); rimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Snv A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politic, in FE~mNIST
LEGAL THEORY, su pr note 45, at 57, 67-68 (noting how some African-Americans criticize women
of their own race for failing to live up to a white female standard of Motherhood); STEPHANIE
COoNTz, THE WAYXWE NEvERWEF.: AmRICAN FA]L.S AND THE NOSrALGIA TRAP 42-67 (1992)
(discussing the roles of tradition, stereotypes, and myths in love and the family); Schnably, supm
note 8, at 854 (noting that the image was not universally met, but was "universally aspired to.")
(citing Epstein, Family Politics and the New Left Leamingfrom Our Oum Experiec SOCIALIST REV.,
May.Aug. 1982, at 141, 145.)).
47. However, women did earn a kind of respect for fulfilling their assigned roles to "care
for and socialize their children," and to "provide a caring refuge" for their husbands. Schnably,
supra note 8, at 853 (describing the woman's function in the traditional, late-nineteenth cen-
tury, bourgeois family).
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case law which formed the source of the right recognized in Roe.4 8
Although Roe completed a cycle of breaking free from the myth in
practice, it relied upon its cosmology in theory.49 And just as a sci-
ence based upon fairy tale and mythology can be exposed as absurd
by unbelievers, a legal right based upon fairy tale and mythology can
be destroyed by opponents. This tension helps to explain the rift
over abortion that our society currently finds nearly unbridgeable.
The cases which form the foundation for Roe v. Wade fall into two
classes: cases about women and women's roles and cases about pri-
vacy. These two strands meet initially in Griswold v. Connecticut,50 but
find their unity in Roe By exploring each class of case, I will demon-
strate how they incorporate the faulty premises of disrespect and fe-
male identification with reproduction in ways that have led to the
problems in abortionjurisprudence.
48. Interestingly, those who believe in the myth of woman's limited role and capacity are
usually the most vociferous opponents of Roe. See Schnably, supra note 8, at 725-29 (discussing
three different approaches to abortion, each based on one's belief of women's role in society).
Many scholarlystudies of the members of both the pro-choice and pro-life movements establish
that at its core, a great deal of the disagreement arises from attitudes about women, women's
roles, and family structure. It is important to note that these attitudes are not universal and not
strictly divided according to identity with either side of the debate. They are also not the only
reasons behind a person's position with respect to abortion. See FAYE GINSBURG, CONTESTED
LIVES, 139-45, 169-70, 194-97 (1989) (reporting that her anthropological study of Fargo, North
Dakota, revealed that pro-life activists identify more with the values of "domesticity," whereas
pro-choice activists see women as autonomous people with an interest in pursuing self-
development through careers as well); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF
MOTHERHOOD 161, 176 (1984) (discussing a sociological study of California activists, which
shows pro-life women are more committed to "traditional" views of women's roles as wives and
mothers, whereas pro-choice activists are more career-oriented); Judith Blake, Eletive Abortion
and Our Reluctant Citizen7y: Research on Public Qpinion in the Untied States, in THE ABORTION
EXPERIENCE 447 (HowardJ. Osofsky &Joy D. Osofsky eds., 1973) (discussing surveys that reveal
that conservative views of the family, gender roles, and sexuality explain much anti-abortion mo-
rality); SHEERAN, supra note 8, at 125-28, 131 (explaining that much of the difference between
pro-life and pro-choice advocates is their view about women's roles and changing them);
EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 126, 154, 184 (noting that differing views on the family, gender
roles within the family, and sexuality, separate pro-life from pro-choice adherents); GELB &
PAILE, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that the threat abortion rights pose to traditional values of
family and sex roles explains the opposition to them);J. Williams, Gender Wars, .supra note 7, at
1580-83 (explaining how the rhetoric of pro-choice and pro-life adherents accentuates their
markedly different views of women's roles in the family and the workplace); accord Siegel, supra
note 9, at 327-28 (noting that the existence of differing views of women's role as mother is a key
to the abortion debate); ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, MOTHER-LOVE AND ABORTION: A LEGAL IN-
TERPRETATION 91 (1988) (noting that traditional views about sex roles characterize many pro-
life adherents); Shannon, supra note 17, at 8 (explaining that critical factors in abortion posi-
tions include one's attitudes about childrearing and social practices, as well as one's education
and class).
49. Women were awarded a privacy right to abort partially upon the bases of their being
victimized by pregnancy and motherhood and being more closely tied to reproduction. See text
accompanying notes I and 21, supra, and Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (discussing how women are victim-
ized by pregnancy).
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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B. Cases About Women and Womens ;Roes
The first class of cases includes cases in three arenas: 1) women in
the workplace, 2) women as citizens51 for both responsibilities and
entitlements, and 3) women as social beings. As the following dis-
cussion demonstrates, the cases consistently view women through
their reproductive capacity, examined from a distinctly male per-
spective. Reproduction makes woman different, unequal. It also
permits law to look right through her, to see the woman not as a
whole person, but as the conduit for future generations.
The Court's ability to ignore women results in two notable effects
upon legal reasoning and, hence law. First, an invisible being, val-
ued primarily as a reproductive conduit, cannot earn the respect
necessary to support an award of power over important life-and-
death-decisions. Second, ignoring women p&rmits a problem to be
viewed in a vacuum, without seeing its interaction with reality.53 Le-
gal reasoning, having lost its moorings to reality, is able to incorpo-
rate conflicting responses as if they were part of an integrated
whole.5 4
1. Women and the Workplace
The workplace cases come first and recur in time. As the case re-
views demonstrate, a woman in the workplace occupies the sphere
carved out for males, a sphere to which she does not belong.55 Her
presence challenges the vision of a woman as less capable of deci-
sionmaking and control and as inseparable from her role as mother.
The image of women in the workplace reflects great difficulty in re-
51. By "citizens," I refer more generally to "political subjects or beings" rather than to citi-
zenship responsibilities as a pure term of art. Thus, military service and welfare benefits may
not depend upon citizenship in the technical sense, but do flow from recognition of political
existence.
52. See CATHARE MACKMNON, A CO1M5MNTARW ON PORNOGRAHY, CIVM RIGHTS AND
SPEE CH, reprinted in 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 5 (1985) (discussing Lochner-erajurisprudence
and its longstanding effects on women and power).
53. For instance, in upholding Congressional refusals to fund Medicaid abortions, the
Court assumed that poor women would have access to abortions, despite their lack of financial
resources. The Court's abstraction of women from their surroundings of poverty and of the
right of choice from its context of medical treatment allows the Court to overlook the reality of
societal constraints and their impact on a woman's life.
54. This phenomenon is evidenced in cases that focus on the differences between women
and men. If a policy disadvantages women by treating them differently from men, it can be up-
held on the basis that women are indeed different from men. But if the policy disadvantages
women by treating them like men, it can be upheld because women and men are equal and
thus must be treated identically. Sameness and difference fluctuate; disadvantage remains con-
stant. EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 65-69, 107; RHODE, supra note 46, at 197.
55. EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 65;J. Wfiliams, Gender Wars, supra note 7, at 1559; J. Wil-
liams, Deconstruding Gender, supra note 45.
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moving the gloss of family-read: pregnancy and motherhood-
from the person as worker.56 It is ironic that in the male-defined
sphere of the marketplace, the woman becomes inseparable from
her family role. This truth is illustrated in the commonplace under-
standing that fatherhood and breadwinning are complementary. Fa-
therhood is never considered in assessing male suitability in the
workplace.5 7 Motherhood, however, is both made inseparable from
the female worker and seen as being in conflict with her role in the
marketplace. Women and work are mutually incompatible. 58 The
workplace has been defined as a place unsuited for mothers, and
women have been defined as actual or potential mothers.59
The leading "workplace" case is Bradwell v. State,60 in which Eliza-
beth Bradwell unsuccessfully challenged the state of Illinois's refusal
to admit her to the bar. The case formed the modem basis for view-
ing gender roles. 61 Justice Miller's majority opinion is devoid of ref-
56. Cf.Julie Novkov, Note, A Deconstruction of (M)otherhood and a Reconstruction ofParenthood,
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 155 (1991) (discussing the construction and grounding of
motherhood in the family/civil society split, and noting how this construction conflicts with a
woman's status as a worker in civil society).
57. Cf. California Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (noting
that extended pregnancy benefits are not unequal, because they permit women to have the
same access to being both parents and workers that men traditionally enjoy); Phyllis T. Book-
span, A De&ate Imbalane: Famiby and Work, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 37 (1995), at 28-40 (noting
that males do not seem to experience a conflict between working and having a family), 57
(stating that men were never compelled to forego marriage and family for a career orjob), 68
(noting that traditional male norms suppress the domestic, non-breadwinning responsibilities of
fatherhood).
58. W. Williams, Equality Crisis, supra note 45, at 15, 22-25.
59. See generally Novkov, supra note 56. But see Pub.LNo. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993)) (federalizing workplace standards that
prevent discrimination against pregnant women).
60. 83 U.S. 130 (1872). In Bradwel, the source for upholding the state's right to exclude
women was a statute stating "No person shall be permitted to practice ... without ... (a] license
... [which] shall authorize him to appear," a statute no one had trouble interpreting as applying
to the male gender alone (emphasis added).
In the current tussle over the necessity for gender-neutral or gender-inclusive language to re-
fer to purportedly inclusive classes of people, many state that "he" is universal and that any sub-
stitution is barbarically awkward. Far worse, it is said, to demean the language than to exclude
an entire gender. And, of course, the quintessentially non-awkward substitute-she"-s rec-
ognized for what it is-noninclusive--and denounced for what it is not-unrealistic and de-
meaning to men. Why is it that the universal "he" is not used when speaking of nurses, secretar-
ies, or elementary school teachers?
Interestingly, although noted neither by the Court nor by justice Bradley in concurrence, the
Illinois legislature had passed a statute on March 22, 1872: "[tlhat no person, shall be precluded
or debarred from any occupation, profession or employment (except military) on account of sex
.... " Laws of 1871-72, 578 cited by CHARLEs FAmi AN, RECONSIRucOnoN AND REUNION, 1864-
1888, at 1366 (1971) [hereinafter FAnZMAN].
61. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AhMERICAN CONSTITIrnONAL LAW, 1555, 1559 (2d ed. 1988)
(quoting from Bradley, J. and discussing Bradwelfs impact on state-based gender discrimina-
tion).
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erences to the issue of gender discrimination in entitlement to prac-
tice law, although Mrs. Bradwell's advocate argued such a claim.6 2 It
is a classic example of abstract analysis, relying upon Miller's opinion
in the Slaughterhouse Cases63 (decided the same day) that the privi-
leges and immunities of citizenship do not include protection of
employment. By treating the case as easy, the majority denied the
concrete personhood of women and treated them and their interests
as invisible. 64 Such analysis is precisely the type of social thought
that has excluded women from the "mainstream," and made it possi-
ble to treat them as distinct, as well as inferior, beings.
Justice Bradley in concurrence voiced significant concern over the
plight of clients unable to hold a woman lawyer to a contract65
(which the law, of course, disabled married women from forming) or
to obtain "those energies and responsibilities, and that decision and
firmness" needed from a lawyer.66 Women shared a "natural and
proper timidity and delicacy"67 unsuited to a profession "demanding
special skill and confidence." 68 Nonetheless, these same women
were suited to the "duties, complications and incapacities"69 thrust
upon them in their "noble and benign offices of wife and
62. FAmiRmN, supra note 60, at 1365; Bradwell 83 U.S. at 135-36 (brief of plaintiff in error).
Such analysis was left unassailed by the Court. This refusal to take seriously claims of inappro-
priate treatment on the basis of gender is not an isolated occurrence. In Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. 162 (1874), the Court delivered a lengthy opinion supporting the status of women as
citizens-one wonders that it seemed such a formidable task to deserve so much ink-but then
concluded that as the states had historically limited voting rights to men, such citizenship did
not entitle women to the privilege of voting, as if it were virtually self-evident. Id at 176-77.
63. 83 U.S. 36,57-83 (1872); Bradwell 83 U.S. at 139.
64. The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion borrowed from Dred Scotv. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857), noting that Illinois citizens are not the same as llinois femae citizens, the latter group
having no basis for claiming differential treatment as among themselves. Such reasoning has
been discredited in the racial context but has persisted in the gender context. See General Elec-
tricv. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1976) (noting that pregnantwomen were not discriminated
against as women, because women too are often "nonpregnant persons").
65. At common law, a married woman was "incapable, without her husband's consent, of
making contracts which [were] binding on her or him. This very incapacity was one circum-
stance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman
incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and
counselor." Bradwel 83 U.S. at 141 (BradleyJ., concurring).
66. "[In my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of
woman, it is within the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings
shall be filled and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and re-
sponsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are presumed to predominate in the sterner
sex." If. at 142.
67. Id. at 141.
68. Id. at 142.
69. Id. at 141. Note how negatively women's roles are viewed, echoed today in the classifi-
cation of pregnancy as a disability.
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mother."70 The energies and responsibilities of raising children, the
decision and firmness required to guide them to become the future,
were either overlooked or invisible. Motherhood was treated as an
"innate" capacity, deserving less respect than the "developed" capaci-
ties attributed to men.7 1 The qualities needed for successful moth-
erhood were not only not attributed to women, but were expressly
found lacking in them.
The primary legacy of Bradwell comes from Bradley's focus upon
women as mothers, capable of functioning only in that sublime des-
tiny, unable to make important decisions, yet somehow especially
endowed with the qualities necessary to be entrusted with the family
and future generations. It is one thing to see this capacity in women.
It is another to see women only in this capacity.
In Bradwell's wake come other cases in which women, now rele-
gated to the servile occupations, have special protections thrust upon
them. Although universal maximum hour legislation had been held
unconstitutional, 72 legislation precluding women from working over
ten hours a day was upheld in Muller v. Oregon.73 Lochner had pro-
tected the freedom to contract out one's labor. Women, however,
having no freedom of contract to secure, were deemed in need of
legislative protection.
Such legislative protection was not designed to further women's
economic interests, power or role in the workplace. Instead, it was
designed to protect women's reproductive organs and maternal
functions. 74 The whole woman disappeared, replaced by her func-
70. See, ag.
It is true that many women are unmarried and are not affected by any of the du-
ties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but these are
exceptions to the general rule. The paramount destiny and mission of woman are
to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator.
Bradueli, 83 U.S. at 141 (BradleyJ., concurring).
71. Cf Novkov, supra note 56, at 169-70 (noting that women have been limited to mother-
hood, constructed as a biological destiny, that motherhood is only valued if the woman is in the
home, and that because motherhood is not considered "work," both it and women are devalued
in the workplace).
72. Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state labor law, providing that
no employees shall be required or permitted to work in bakeries more than sixty hours a week,
or ten hours a day, was not a legitimate interest of the state, but an unreasonable, unnecessary
and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract. As such, it was
in conflict with, and void under, the United States Constitution).
73. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
74. Muller 208 U.S. at 420-21; seejudith Olans Brown, Lucy A. WMlilams & Phyllis Tropper
Baumann, The Mythogenesis of Gender. Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6
U.C.LA WOMEN's LJ. 457, 472-74 (1996) [hereinafter Mythogenesis] (arguing that Muller dem-
onstratesjudidal reliance upon myths about women and motherhood, in finding it necessary to
protect women but not men because of their physical "frailty" and reproductive role).
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tion as family maker and child bearer/rearer. The Court's opinion
relied predominately on health reasons to sustain the legislation.75
Women could not be expected to spend hours on their feet daily
withoutjeopardizing their ability to be healthy mothers. Presumably,
mothers do not have such physical demands placed on them-
lifting, standing, being on call for up to ten hours a day.76 Yet, the
woman's health was not the priority. Only because "healthy mothers
are essential to vigorous offspring," was women's health and well-
being "an object of public interest and care."77 Women became
physical chambers whose public role was to bear the next generation.
Protection justified by difference enabled men to exclude women
not only from professions, but also from better paying servile occu-
pations. 78
Muller v. Oregon79 sets out the Catch-22 of rights analysis for
women. Women were not given equal rights at their legal insistence,
because they were incapable of "a full assertion of those rights."80
The law did not trust women to know their own rights or interests-
or to place them in social context. Women's rights, apparently, had
to be identifledfor them by men. Men then had to assert the rights,
because women would not, or more accurately, could not.8 1 No one
seemed to notice that this reasoning was fully in conflict with itself.
Women cannot have rights unless they assert them, and therefore
society keeps women from asserting those rights. Presumably, the
75. Eg., Muller, 208 U.S. at419-20.
76. Domestic workers, who were overwhelmingly women, and farm workers, who included
women, were not "protected" by this legislation, yet were expected to work even longer hours at
more physically strenuous work without concern for their personal or reproductive health. See
Rhode, supra note 46.
77. 208 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added). "The reasons for the reduction of the working day
to ten hours--(a) the physical organization ofwomen, (b) her maternal functions, (c) the rear-
ing and education of the children, (d) the maintenance of the home" are accepted as valid. Id.
at 420, n.1.
78. Note also that men are disadvantaged in this system if they are not in the upper or pro-
fessional classes. Men are helped by the law to compete only with each other for positions, but
they win this "prize" of excessively brutal, long, and underpaid hours to earn profits for others.
This strategy resembles "divide and conquer." Placed above one group, the continuing exploita-
tion by another group becomes less visible and more tolerable. See Frances Ansley, Stin'ing the
Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELLL. REV. 993, 1055-58 (1989)
(noting also the effectiveness of this strategy in the context of race). See also U.A.W. v.Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (noting that the exclusion of women from the worlkplace can de-
flect the remaining workers from acting in their own interest to improve the conditions under
which they labor). Cf. Laurie NsiahJefferson, Rebroductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income
Women, 11 WoMtEN'S RTs. L. REP. 15, 27-29 (1989).
79. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
80. Id. at 422.
81. Id. at 421-22. Women could not make their own choices to be self-reliant because they
did not have "the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights." I&t As long as men suco
cessfuily exclude women, women will not be able to have rights.
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advantage of abstract reasoning is that it is principled, consistent and
logical. But for women, abstraction denied reality and transmuted
itself into harm.
Adkins v. Children's HospitaP2 illustrates this concept well. In
Adkins, the challenged legislation was designed to provide women
with a "living wage": what they needed to support themselves and to
rear children.83 The legislature had determined that the low in-
come of women impaired both their health and that of the next gen-
eration, because it led to "undernourishment, demoralizing shelter
and insufficient medical care."84 The subsidy of charities was
"impotent amelioration rather than prevention."85
This legislation created problems in the eyes of the Court. First,
its beneficiaries were women, and women alone. Women were bene-
fiting in a most unbefitting place-the workplace. The legislature
had identified the problem: women were underpaid. 86 Its Constitu-
tional error was attempting to rectify the problem by requiring
women to be paid an adequate wage, and defining adequacy accord-
ing to value-based standards, i.e., the amount necessary to meet the
costs of living, maintain good health, and protect morals.87 With the
legislation, women could not be utilized and paid less than the true
cost of their labor. The need for such legislation reflects the success
of Bradwel's social vision of women and Muller's consignment of
them to noncompetitive work. Take away woman's right and power
to contract, make her invisible as herself, and the business world will
be able to offer her employment at less than her value. Relegate
women to the jobs no one else wants and to jobs that are limited in
ways men need not suffer (hours, etc.), and women will make less
than a living wage and less than they are worth. 88
The brief submitted in support of the legislation noted that ex-
ploitative employers created "human deterioration" and in effect en-
joyed a public subsidy.89 The brief recognized that abstract rights
create unreal dualities-a woman's "right" to work is meaningless
when an employer's "right" to pay less than value is a necessary corol-
82. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
83. As the Court described it, the basis of payment for services rendered would be "not the
value of the service rendered, but the extraneous circumstance that the employee needs to get
a prescribed sum of money to insure their subsistence, health and morals." Id. at 558.
84. Id at 528.
85. Id. at 528-29.
85. Id at 525.
87. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
88. RHODE, supra note 46.
89. 261 U.S. at 532; i at 567 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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lary.90 With "rights" at a standoff against each other, power takes
over.9 1 The woman does not hold the power. The Court perverts
rights when it recognizes women's rights only after granting the
more powerful employer the right to infringe upon her humanity.
Once again, abstraction leads to distortion and makes it invisible.9 2
After having prevented women from exercising the equal right to
contract out their labor in Muler, the Court in Adkins found that
these same women miraculously possessed the power to bargain ef-
fectively within their legal limitations to be treated equally.9-3 The
deception is strangely attractive in rights-based analysis. First, set the
premises: remove rights and powers, make women unequal. Then,
assume equality and require the disadvantaged to exercise the
"rights" and powers of which they have been deprived. The law thus
created a double-bind for women. Woman's difference is the
ground upon which to permit legal restrictions of her activities. How-
ever, legal and social support for women in their designated role is
virtually nonexistent.94 Adkins demonstrates that such support will
be found to be invalid when it does exist.
Women are isolated in their motherhood; they alone are respon-
sible for any children they have. Yet, society is authorized to burden
them for the good of society as a whole. When support for women is
legislated as being in the public interest, as in Adkins, it proves vul-
nerable to attack and is struck down. The maximum hour cases
"protect" women, but only by preserving their economic inferiority
and institutionalizing women's work as domestic, servile, and non-
intellectual. Conversely, legislation mandating that the economic
reward for "women's work" approximate its social value apparently
conflicts with the vision of women as economically inferior and is
dangerous (even though it may contribute to healthy childrearing).
90. Rights let the government intervene to correct a wrong; if the government has no
power to intervene, then the actors are free to act as they will. If their interests conflict, as
here, the actor free to act as he chooses is the actor with the superior power, the one able to
enforce his will against the other.
91. RHODE, supra note 46.
92. See generally Julia Epstein, The Pregnant Imagination, Fetal Rights, and Women's Bodies: A
ffutoricalInqufry, 7 YA EJ.L. 8 HUNMAN. 139 (1995) (exploring the historical underpinnings of
criminalizing the actions of pregnant women regarding their fetuses).
93. 261 U.S. at532.
94. See Siegel, supra note 9, at 261, 345-46, 366 (1992) (discussing that the coercive means
leveled against women to ensure fetal protection "promote the welfare of the unborn only when
it can use women's bodies ... and not when the community as a whole would have to bear the
costs of its moral preferences"); Gayle Binion, ReproductiveFreedom and the Constitution The Limits
of Choice, 4 BERR=W. L.J. 12, 24, et seq. (1988) (discussing how the government and case law
have failed to restrict state incursions into parenting or to support reproductive choice with
positive policies).
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Denying the legislature's power to grant a "living wage" to women
denies mutual social responsibility and social connection with chil-
drearing.
Thus, the workplace cases identify women with their reproductive
capacities, and protect the white, urban, middle-class family by ex-
cluding women from other endeavors (the "traditional" workplace).
Female reproduction is inextricably linked with childrearing, not
simply gestation.9 5 Reproduction not only defines women, it makes
them unique, distinctive. 96  The cases use this "distinction"--
reproductive capacity-to isolate women-from each other, from
men, and from society.97 Beyond this, these cases set up the dichot-
omy between decisionmaking capacity and reproductive and child-
bearing capacity, treating them as mutually exclusive.9 8
Other workplace cases reflect this dichotomy. Despite their par-
ticipation in the marketplace, a place where decisions are made,
women are treated as children, unable to make their own decisions,
in need of protection and subject to moral guidance. Thus, it is al-
lowable to require that women who bartend be the wives and daugh-
ters of bar owners.9 9 Women and children are even lumped to-
gether as appropriate objects of protective maximum working hours
legislation, presumably because both are incapable of making the
choices to protect themselves. 100
95. See Novkov, supra note 56, at 171-72 (noting that by placing women in the family, sod-
ety associates not only pregnancy, but childbearing, with women, and assigns that role to
them)."
96. Women alone become identified wvith reproduction; men are not identified with repro-
duction. Rather than seeing reproduction as the quintessential characteristic necessitating the
involvement of both sexes, the Court views reproduction as a peculiar capacity unique to women.
97. Isolation denies a fundamental reality of many women, i.e., that the family and the re-
productive experience form connections. The characteristic used to define women has been
perverted into a weapon against her reality. See Robin West, Jurispudee and Gender, in
MILNSTLEGALTHEORY201 (Katherine Bartlett & Roseann Kennedy eds., 1991).
98. See.Bradwell and Mullerdiscussions supra, notes 60-81.
99. Goesaertv. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,467 (1948). Justice Frankfurter's opinion is dismissive
of the issue as having any serious implications. "Beguiling as the subject is it need not detain us
long. To ask [the question] is in effect to answer it." Id. at 465. Far from being "irrational dis-
crimination," this law is supportable "[slince bartending by women may ... give rise to moral
and social problems," and the legislature may believe "that as to a defined group of females
other factors are operating which either eliminate or reduce" those problems. "The oversight
... by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid without
such protective oversight." Id. at 466. Such legislative analysis deserves deference according to
Frankfurter. Apparently, it is sensible to assume that women need to be under the direction
and protection of "their male."
100. "The legislation is purely a police regulation intended to establish the rights of children
and women, who are treated as in a certain sense dependent and under an industrial disadvan-
tage by reason of age and sex, to regular hours of employment for limited and designated peri-
ods of time, with fixed intervals for rest and refreshment." Riley v. Commonwealth of Mass., 232
U.S. 671, 677 (1914).
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The ultimate workplace problem, however, occurs when women's
reproductive capacity is added onto the woman in the workplace.1 01
Sometimes the woman's pregnancy forces the society to see her as a
whole woman,1 02 rather than a diminished man, in the workplace.
Other times, an employer's policy forces women to be viewed in their
reproductive capacity while men are not.1 03 In both instances, there
is nothing quite so tense as seeing the whole woman as fitting into
the workplace. In General Electric v. Gilbert, the Court held that ex-
cluding pregnancy from disability coverage and medical insurance is
appropriate and not a badge of inequality.1 04 Only women can get
pregnant, but because not all women do, there is no need to provide
for such a contingency to ensure equal treatment.105 Pregnancy ne-
cessitates or at least justifies different treatment. Pregnancy is
unique because the "worker" does not get pregnant, only the
"mother" does. Because the pregnant worker can only be a woman,
her image cannot comfortably be superimposed upon the work-
place.1 0 ° With pregnancy, we must either recognize womanhood as
belonging in the workplace, or exclude it from recognition to be
sure that all workers fit the mold cast from the male.107
If the employer recognizes the woman's reproductive capacity, it is
likely to treat her differently. Rather than focus upon the worker-
need for protection, modem employers have attempted to skip i-
rectly to protecting a woman's genetic material and any potential fe-
tus.108 It is not the pregnant woman alone, it is the potentiallyfertile
woman who is excluded from the "dangerous" jobs which just hap-
pen to be the high-paying, preferred jobs.10 9  The woman is not
given the choice-it is made for her, whether or not she has chosen
101. Sep ag., .ISENSmEIN, supra note 40, at 57; J. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, supra note
45.
102. Eg., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,496-97 (1974).
103. Fg., U.A.W. v.Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,199, 207 (1991).
104. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
105. d. at 136-37.
106. EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 57, 102-07; Christine .ittleton, Reconsruding Sexual Eual-
ity, reprinted in .MmiNzsr LEGAL TBiEoRY, supra, note 46, at 42-43; W. Williams, Equality Crisis, su.
pra note 45, at 22-26.
107. EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 102-07;J. Williams, Deronstructing Genda, supra note 45, at
106-12.
108. Eg., Jean M. Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and -enetic Hazards in the Workplace: Challenging
the Myths of the Tort and Worhers' Compensation Systems, 60 FORDHAM L. REV, 843, 865 (1992).
109. Seegenerally Mary Becker, Reproducitve HazardsAfierjohnson Controls, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 43
(1994) (providing an overview of workplace hazards and differentiating between fetal and
women's health considerations).
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not to become a mother.110 In support, employers note that women
may prefer to be protected, insulated, and separated from men, pro-
ceeding from the premise that women should not have the choice to
be protected or to risk exposure. Choice is dangerous; it gives con-
trol and requires recognition that women are capable of decision-
making and deserve the consequences of that responsibility.111
Against this background of exclusion, the Court continues to have
great difficulty in deciding how to treat women. Many recent issues
of gender equality have sprung from the enforcement of the distinc-
tion between the male sphere of the workplace and the female
sphere of dependent domesticity.112 The traditional exclusion of
women redounds to their disadvantage, because other entitlements
are often based upon inclusion in the workplace.
When an exclusion disadvantages women, it is unlikely to be rec-
ognized. Exclusion from the military is especially problematic. For
example, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Court
upheld lifetime preferential hiring policies for veterans.' 13 Despite
the necessary result that men got positions and women did not, the
Court viewed the exclusion as an unintended, inevitable, and there-
fore appropriate result of a natural and preferred order. Women fit
neither in the military nor in the workplace, so nothing is amiss.114
If the exclusion apparently disadvantages men, it is far more likely
that the Court will see inequality and require correction. Frontiero v.
110. U.A.W. v.Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991). Injohnson Controls, the employer re-
fused to assign any woman under 50 who had not been sterilized to work with lead batteries,
even if she was single, planned to have no children or no more children, or gave other indica-
tions she would not get pregnant (note that the Court refused to accept the employer's differ-
ential treatment, finding it to be sex discrimination under Title VII and rejecting the em-
ployer's defense of b[ona] f[ide] o[ccupational] q[ualification]). Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note
78, at 15; Siegel, supra note 9, at 261.
111. To require employers to relieve women or any worker from jobs which are hazardous to
reproductive health on each worker's request does not become legally impossible if the law for-
bids employers from making that choice for every woman. SeeJohnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211
(noting that the male plaintiff who sought reassignment to protect his genetic material was de-
nied such a request).
112. Nadine Taub & Elizabeth Schneider, Perspectives on Womenr Subordination and the Role of
Law, in THE PoLiTIcs OF LAW 117 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Diane Polan, Toward a Theoy of Law
and Patriarchy, in THE PoLITIcs OF LAW 294 (David Karys ed., 1982); J. Williams, Gender Wars,
supra note 7, at 1559,1596-1608.
113. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
114. See Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Polily:
Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUE LJ. 324, 860 (critiquing Feeney and suggesting that equal
protection intent to discriminate be satisfied by proving the legislature ignored or acted without
thinking about relevant groups (otherwise there is an incentive for ignorance and continued ad-
vantaging of the same group) or by showing the legislature would never have done the opposite
(e.g., give women 98% of all lifetime hiring preferences). The test should prevent placing bur-
dens on one group that would never be placed upon the other group.) This illustrates how
womens disadvantages remain invisible while men's disadvantages are starkly highlighted.
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Richardson115 recognized an inequality when males were disadvan-
taged by the assumption that only female spouses were likely to be
supported by a member of the Armed Forces. 116 When discrimina-
tion against women causes harm to men by differential treatment,
the inequality becomes visible. The solution is to treat men similarly,
despite the fact that women may still face discrimination. Rather
than correcting the underlying inequality, the Court ensures that
men are not visibly harmed by its continued existence. 117  Any re-
maining inequality is simply deemed to be the nature of things.
The Court is more apt to accommodate female inequality than to
correct it. Thus, women in the military are permitted to take more
time to achieve a promotion, because women are excluded from the
combat duty which earns credits for promotion. 118 This result pre-
serves from challenge women's exclusion from combat or the use of
combat as an essential qualification. Rather than reformulate the
workplace to put both men and women at its center, special treat-
ment keeps women out of the workplace or on its periphery.
These workplace cases expose key assumptions about women.
Women are identified as reproductive machines: "woman" is socially
constructed as "potential mother."119 This identification is linked to
a judicially decreed incapacity for sound decisionmaking. Such in-
capacity provides the justification for why women need protection
rather than rights, and why they are not suitable holders and enforc-
ers of rights. Motherhood is a claim on women, made by children
115. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
116. Similarly, inequalitywas apparent when men were disadvantaged in Califbno v. Wescott,
443 U.S. 76 (1979) and Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980). Although
nominally about entitlements to government benefits, both cases were really about the vision of
women in the workplace. In Wwol AFDC benefits were payable to families if the male was un-
employed, but not if the female was unemployed. In Wngkr, automatic death benefits under
Workers' Compensation were payable to female spouses but not to male spouses of the em-
ployee. The Court invalidated both schemes. The Court was able to recognize the inequality,
because the schemes treated males poorly. Through that insight, the Court grasped that this
inequality rested upon devaluingwomen's role in the marketplace and their contribution to the
family. This second step is a giant one for the Court. Here, the Court realized that the appar-
ent favoring of women as dependents actually demeaned and degraded women as contributors
to the workplace and family. It is notable, however, that in Wengi, correcting this inequity may
lead to taking benefits away from women. Although this may be appropriate, it fails to reflect
on the remaining underlying inequalities. Likewise, it fails to insist upon their correction. For
instance, if the legislature terminated death benefits to spouses because theywere unlikely to be
dependent upon the employee, this "equal" treatment would have severely disadvantaged
women, whose dependency is expected and reinforced. In addition, even working women are
more likely to be more dependent upon the salaries of their husbands than vice versa, as
women's wages notoriously lag behind men's. See, eg., Siegel, sup ra note 9, at 261, 376-77.
117. Siegel, supra note 9, at 261, 376-77.
118. Schlesingerv. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,508 (1975).
119. S.-fythognesds supra note 74, at 475, 497-98.
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and by society as a whole. Motherhood becomes a basis upon which
to distribute social burdens,120 but not benefits or rights.
2. Women and Civic Responsibilities and Entitlements
A second type of case deals with women as citizens, subject to civic
responsibilities or entitled to civic rewards. The civic responsibilities
of men include military service registration, jury duty and subjection
to criminal laws.12 1 Civic entitlements include access to government
benefits, power to control private property, and access to educa-
tion.122 To deny women civic responsibilities treats women as un-
worthy and incapable of exercising responsibility and, therefore,
power. The following cases demonstrate that this deprivation of re-
sponsibilities has been justified by viewing female reproductive ca-
pacity as incompatible with fulfilling civic responsibilities. 123 Those
who do not fulfill responsibilities are often treated as undeserving of
entitlements.
a. Responsibilities
One way of depriving women of equal responsibility is to treat re-
sponsibility as a male burden, or disadvantage. Military service is in-
deed a sacrifice, one which is recognized, respected and re-
warded. 124 In Rostker v. Goldberg,125 the Court sanctioned male-only
registration because female registration would be inconvenient and
essentially worthless. Women were excluded to ensure that soldiers
120. Siegel, supra note 9, at 261, 345-47, 365-66.
121. Those responsibilities also include voting rights, which women earned only through
U.S. CoNSr. amend. XIX in 1920, after they were explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in
1874 in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874). See supra note 62 (discussing women's voting
rights).
122. Seeinfatextaccompanyingnotes 156-78 (discussing entitlements).
123. Notably, even when women's exclusion from jury duty was successfully challenged, the
Court reasoned that the peculiar "domestic" qualities of women belonged on juries. See Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (stating that Florida's statute exempting women from jury
duty unless they voluntarily register for service is valid due to women's "special responsibilities").
Women remained practically exempted or excluded from jury responsibility, even under this
scheme.
124. Interestingly, many men attribute their willingness to serve as being necessary "to pro-
tect ourwomen." COOiNz, supra note 46, at 51. Military rank can also be a privilege, one tradi-
tionally shared by the powerful of this generation with the next generation of the potentially
powerful.
125. See453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981) (stating that the purpose of Selective Service was to draft and
develop combat troops. Since women are precluded from combat service, female registration is
unnecessary).
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had the necessary skill, strength, and intellect for combat.126
Women belonged not in combat, but in the home, as mothers
and peacemakers.' 27
Women were also excluded from jury duty for reasons related to
126. Sez i& at 81-82 (arguing that employing women for emergency non-combat positions
would be burdensome for a number of "administrative" reasons, including housing, physical
standards, dependency, and military flexibility). In addition, apparently some believe that if the
sexes mix in the Armed Forces, there will be sexuality problems in the front lines. I& If the
sexes cannot work together without sexuality, what are the underlying premises of this society,
and who has created them? Is combat really sexually exciting? What construct of sexuality
makes it so? What of other options, ones not dependent upon restructuring the military's per-
sonnel preferences? What of using the draft to fill all military positions (as it does) and still
placing only men on the front lines? Or what about sex-segregated units? Total exclusion is
hardly the only-or even the best-answer to these concerns, were we to ascribe legitimacy to
them. See id. (arguing that these approaches are not worthwhile, as women are prohibited from
combat duty. Emergency troops need to be flexible for military purposes. Female conscripts
would not meet this military demand).
127. What better reason to put them into the front lines and the command posts? Putting
women onto the combat front lines might make the powerful consider the lives at stake. If we
do not want our daughters to fight and die, do we want our sons to? SeeW. Williams, Equality
Crisi, supra note 45, at 19, 21. Also, the Selective Service exempts males who are breadwinner
fathers. If military service would wrench a needed parent from the family, a gender-neutral ex-
emption would protect those families. Thus, the argument about tearing mothers away from
their families is specious and makeweight. More to the point, it displays the rampant inability or
refusal to see "women," rather than "mothers."
Wendy Williams suggests that women disserve the cause of equality in being willing to exempt
themselves from military service. First, it absolves women from personal responsibility. Second,
it weakens women's claim to their "share" of social benefits. Id. at 21. With one's own life at
risk, resistance for peace might be more meaningful.
However, it strikes me that the ultimate sacrifice for women -motherhood-is interestingly
parallel to the ultimate sacrifice for men. To be a soldier-to kill and risk death-requires a
person to be able to detach himself, to deal with self and other abstractly. To be a mother-to
wholly give one's self to give life to another-requires a person to be able to attach herself, to
lose ego boundaries and be subsumed in the other on a routine and concrete level. See
COONTZ, supra note 46, at 42-67. The near total sacrifice of self is common, although it mani-
fests quite differently. The social consequences are reward, gratitude, and a sense of debt to
the soldier. But for the mother, we have only a somewhat fulfilled sense of expectation and
entitlement to her services. The soldier bears our-burdens. The mother, if she is even consid-
ered to be burdened, bears her "own." Cf. Siegel, supra note 9, at 261, 366 (stating that for
other social benefits bestowed by individuals, society offers reward, support and/or compensa-
tion). The failure to accept women's contributions enables society to believe that women not
subject to the draft shirk personal responsibility and fail to bear their full share of society's bur-
dens.
Another very interesting anthropological finding reveals the harm in the dichotomizing of
male and female roles. Societies with males significantly involved in the nurturing of infants
and children are societies with no tradition of the aggressive, warrior male. KAIENJOHNSON &
TOM FERGUSON, TRUSTING OURSELVES: THE SOURCEBOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY FOR WOMEN 86-87(1990).
[In societies] [w]here women's work other than childcare is considered essential
and important, men's investment in parenting increases. And in cultures where
men are closely involved with young children, there is little warfare. In societies
where warfare is important, fathers tend to be distant. And, in societies where war
is an important occupation for men, women's role is generally not considered to
be of high importance.
Id at 87 dtingKatz and Kooner, The Role of the Father An Anthropological Ppective, in THE ROLE
OFTHEFATHERIN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 166-80 (M. Lamb, ed. 1981).
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their role in the family and the home. Initially, the Court approved
of this.128 The jury, embodiment of community conscience andjus-
tice, had no room for women. It was notjust that women should be
able to remain at home; it was that the home had to be protected by
excluding women. 12 9 Even when the Court struck down the exclu-
* sion of women, it did so because a universal rule of needing to stay
home was overbroad.130 The negative social effects were deemed to
flow from the exclusion of women's "unique" maternal compas-
sion,13! not from the discriminatory exclusion of important and
contributing members from full participation. 132
The most telling case is Michael M. v. Sonoma County,133 where the
plaintiff attacked California's statutory rape law for including only
males as potential violators. Key to the decision upholding the law
was the Court's belief that males had to be deterred from teenage
sex by the criminal law, whereas females were deterred by always be-
ing the victims of intercourse and pregnancy.134 Dealing explicitly
with social responses to sexuality,13 5 the Court revealed its view of
women as reproducers but not as moral agents in all its manifesta-
tions.
The United States Supreme Court adopted the California Su-
preme Court's language in rejecting the challenge, finding that be-
cause the classification was based upon "the immutable physiological
fact" that females exclusively become pregnant, it was nondiscrimi-
128. Contra, qf, Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (stating that the unilateral
exclusion of women was a deviation from normal jury selection and may be remedied by the
court).
129. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (stating that a woman should be allowed to
relieve herself from jury duty due to her household responsibilities as the "center of the home
and family life.").
130. Id. at 68-69; See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1979) (stating that the univer-
sal exclusion of all women due to the domestic responsibilities of some was an improperjustifi-
cation for the exemption).
131. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62. Although satirizing this reasoning as "mystical incantations" and
"transcendental notions," Justice Rehnquist could see no basis for women to claim a wrong to
them from an automatic exemption, betraying his failure to see harm to women due to exclu-
sion from participation. 439 U.S. at 370,372 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
132. The dissent in Duren actually opined that family protection is a valid reason to treat
women differently, especially as we do not need women asjurors. See 439 U.S. at 372-75 (stating
that women, as centers of the home, would be burdened if treated exactly as men) (Rehnquist,
J. dissenting). Contrastwith Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1986), in which the Court
held that the exclusion from jury service on the basis of race was a harm to the exdudedjurs, as
discrimination on the basis of race.
133. Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S,464 (1981).
134. Id. at 473.
135. See id. at 468-76 (stating that because the physical effects and consequences of inter-
course are different for young men and women, with the burden of childbirth on women, the
statute's sex-based standard did not violate the Constitution).
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natory.1 36 A statute aimed at the joint activity of intercourse was
thus viewed through the lens of female difference. Notably, it was
both because females become pregnant and because "males alone
can physiologically cause the result" of pregnancy1 S7 that males
needed to be deterred. Because teenage pregnancy is such a tragic
burden on females this "gender classification was readily justified as a
means of identifying offender and victim."'1 88
Thus the male alone is the actor and the causer; the female is the
acted upon and the victim. Males, who are responsible for their
conduct and exercise choice, are subjected to societal legal stan-
dards. But females are not responsible for making moral and practi-
cal decisions and are not held socially accountable for them. In-
stead, females are "naturally" penalized by pregnancy and childbirth,
and therefore excused from legal responsibility for their choices and
conduct. 139  The Court decides the legislature legitimately
"attack[ed] the problem ... directly by prohibiting a male from having
intercourse with a minor female."140 Note that the female's accep-
tance of the responsibility of childrearing is here invisible. It is her
"lot," her burden, not a manifestation of her active participation and
seizing of responsibility in her life. Endowing females with moral
agency and legal responsibility .is at best considered an "indirect"
means of achieving a social policy of responsibility.141
Despite propounding this view of women, the Court asserts that
upholding the law based upon this view does not "demean the ability
or social status" of females, but instead is merely sensible.14 2 The
Court's premise is that males and females not only have distinct roles
in procreation, but that those roles reflect different responsibility for
the resulting offspring.14 3 There is no physiological fact which ren-
ders childrearing a female function, and females passive victims of
procreation. These "social, medical, and economic conse-
136. I.at471-73.
137. I& at 467. As Wendy Williams points out, this is a distinctly unscientific description of
human reproduction. W. Williams, Equality Cisis, supranote 45, at 20.
138. Sew Michdel M., 450 U.S. at 467 (stating that the male is the only actor, the aggressor,
the causer-in a crime defined as voluntary and consensual intercourse).
139. See id. at 473 (stating that it is reasonable to punish only males, as they suffer fewer con-
sequences, whereas females suffer almost all of the consequences of sex, i.e. pregnancy).
140. Id. at 472-73 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 469.
143. The Court betrays this faulty premise when it notes that the consequences of teenage
pregnancy fall upon "the mother, her child, and the State." MichaM., 450 U.S. at470.
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quences" 14 4 are imposed from without by society, not generated
from within by female reproduction.
By making the males the only moral agents with responsibility, the
Court enshrined and perpetuated male control and female passivity
in reproduction. Such male control then entitled females to protec-
tion.I 45 While the Court was beginning to recognize female
"equality" in the workplace and outside world, it was unable to treat
females with equality in the intimate world of family, relationships
and reproduction. 14 6 By focusing upon women as gestators and re-
producers, the Courtjustified differential treatment that is ultimately
disrespectful of women. It used the second-class status of women as
the premise for differential treatment.147 In any other context, this
would amount to intent to discriminate. Here, it became proof of
what is "proper." In spite of women's differences, we must treat
women differently precisely because of these differences. 148
A society that did not consider sex to be male and childbirth to be
female would visit the same natural, social and legal consequences
on both partners in procreation. Essentially, the Court sanctioned
the social discrimination that leads to the usual consequence of
pregnancy being a wholly female burden. By apparently exempted
women from responsibility for the decision to have intercourse, the
Court really exempts men from the responsibility for the decision to
create, bear, and raise a child.
Looking at the issue as female pregnancy isolates the female. Of
course women look different from men if the result of sexual inter-
course is pregnancy. Men and women look the same if the result is
procreation, a collaborative effort that does not cease to be collabora-
144. Id. Interestingly, the father, the "sole cause" of pregnancy, has no social role in its con-
sequences.
145. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape. A Femnint Critique of Rights Analysis, in FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 45, at 305, 306.
146. "Equality" in the outside world merely allows females to have access to the things that
males want, in a structure created and based in a male-centered universe. But equality within
family and relationships would require recognizing that women's attributes are as valuable as
men's, and to account for women as persons beyond their "sex roles." See EISENSTEIN, supra
note 40, at 55, 63-75.
147. This culminated in the assertion that the conscious decision of the California legisla-
ture to overturn a gender-neutral statutory rape decision actually proved lack of discrimination,
because the legislature is a good source of "deciding what is 'current' and what is 'outmoded' in
the perception of women." 450 U.S. at 471 n.6.
148. The "because of" / "in spite of" dichotomy exposes its absurd underbelly. See Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 258 (1979). In MichaelM, principled analysis would expose the
fact that differential treatment in statutory rape reinforces the stereotype of women as passive,
nonresponsible victims. Instead, the Court perverts analysis to uphold the stereotype. See W.
Williams, supra note 45, at 21 (stating that "[d]riven by the stereotype of male as aggres.
sor/offender and woman as passive victim, even the facts of conception are transformed to fit
the image").
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tive after intercourse is over.14 9 In a world dominated by male as-
sumptions, the female stands out on the basis of her reproductive
capacity not because she procreates but because she does so differ-
ently from the male.1 50
In concurrence, Justice Blackmun recognized that the legislation
exerted social "control and direction of young people's sexual activi-
ties,"151 but missed the point that the control is exercised by remov-
ing only the minor female's ability to make her own choices and con-
trol her own sexuality.152 In essence, both he and the Court accept
that women belong in the role of being acted upon-before, during,
and after-rather than participating in procreation. Once again,
rights analysis fails to recognize that women deserve control because
they are moral agents responsible for their own decisions and conse-
quences.
Justice Brennan's dissent noted that the law "protects" females
from their own uninformed decisionmaking, but presumed that
males are "capable of making such decisions themselves."'153 In con-
trast to Brennan's recognition of gender stereotyping, Justice Ste-
vens' dissent treated the capacity to become pregnant as an ultimate
justification for differential treatment.154 However, if females need
protection because they cannot make good decisions, it is oxymo-
ronic to assume they will be deterred by the risk of pregnancy, i.e.,
that they will decide not to have sex.155 The argument assumes that
149. It is very hard to see invidious discrimination from the perspective of the one defining
the differences and its consequences. Minow, supra note 45.
150. EISENSTEN, supra note 40, at 55-57, 65,102-05.
151. 450 U.S. at 482 (Blackmun,J., concurring). Justice Brennan also noted the contradic-
tion inherent in the Court's stance: "Common sense ... suggests that gender-neutral statutory
rape law is potentially a greater deterrent of sexual activity than a gender-based law, for the
simple reason that a gender-neutral law subjects both men and women to criminal sanctions and
thus has a deterrent effect in tice as many potential violations." 450 U.S. at 493-94 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that to uphold discriminatory treatment in statutory
rape laws, the Court opened its eyes to the significant consequences this society heaps only
upon women who have children as teenagers. Id. at 481-82. But the Court is conveniently blind
to this disproportionate responsibility when those same teenagers seek to exercise it by aborting.
152. See Olsen, supra note 145, at 486.
153. 450 U.S. at 495-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan attributed this distortion to the
morals-based early laws. Td. This is too superficial. Control over female sexuality maintains con-
trol over female exclusion from the public sphere, relegating reproduction to the female and
the private sphere. However, once reproduction is relegated to the female, males must control
female sexuality in order to control the "propagation of the species." Colb, supra note 40, at
101. In 1981, the year the Court decided MichaelM, the underlying premises of female capacity
seem no different than they were in 1908. Mullerv. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
154. Michael M. v. Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464,499-500 (StevensJ, dissenting).
155. The fact that "a female confronts a greater risk of harm than a male is a reason for ap-
plying the problem to her-not a reason for granting her a license to use her own judgment on
whether or not to assume the risk." Id. at 499 (StevensJ, dissenting).
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the risk of pregnancy creates an instinctual, thoughtless deterrence
to which females can respond, whereas the decisionmaking exercise
mandated by considering legal ramifications of behavior is beyond
female capacity. Unfortunately, neither dissenter was able to see and
expose this fallacy.
b. Entitlements
Because women are not allowed to share the responsibilities of
citizenship, they are not welcomed to participate in its privileges or
entitlements. The privilege of responsibility is power: power to de-
cide, respect for the decision and accountability for conse-
quences. 156 Power is a source to create equality. One qualifies for
entitlements but earns privileges. Entitlements are the largess of the
privileged to the underprivileged. Thus, it is only consistent that we
see women deprived of responsibilities but given entitlements. Enti-
tlements are not dangerous. They are the gifts of the protectors.
Most entitlements are economic and appear to be compensatory,
responsive to women's exclusion from full economic rights and op-
portunities. 15 7  But, when the entitlement is soda it is not seen as
156. This connection between power and responsibility is illustrated in Kirchberg v. Feen-
stra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), which struck down a Louisiana law giving husbands the unilateral
power to dispose of community property. Despite the fact that a wife had the ability to chal-
Ienge the property disposition, the Court determined she was not responsible for such disposi-
tion because she faced an obstacle imposed solely upon the basis of gender. "By granting the
husband exclusive control over the disposition of community property, [the Louisiana statute]
dearly embodies the type of express gender-based discrimination that [the Court has] found
unconstitutional absent a showing that the classification is tailored to further an important gov-
ernmental interest." 450 U.S. at 459-60.
157. The entitlement cases again involve men challenging schemes which automatically en-
title women but not men. As noted earlier, such challenges enable the Court to see unequal
treatment, because men are disadvantaged. When women are disadvantaged, nothing seems
amiss. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (recognizing discrimination on the basis
of gender and requiring the Armed Services to treat men and women equally in granting de-
pendent benefits. The Services had automatically treated female, but not male, spouses as de-
pendents.). See also Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (overturning a
scheme of automatic death benefits only to workers' female spouses); Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 686 (1975) (requiring Social Security death benefits to be payable to males as well
as to females and children).
Both Wenglrand Weinberger recognized that the schemes which disadvantaged male survivors
were premised upon traditional and inappropriate notions of women's role as being in the
home, dependent, rather than in the workplace, supporting self and others. Such insights are
possible here not because the Court sees discrimination against women in the workplace, but
because the differential in entitlements apparently harm men who also want benefits. Until
men complained, the Court could not see inequality in women's place in the workplace. Enti-
tlements such as those at stake in these cases are socially responsive to the problems created by
the underlying inequities in women's economic position, inequities reinforced by earlier Court
decisions thatwomen could be selectively excluded from the workplace and by the social expec-
tations that middle-class women would not participate in the marketplace. See also COONTZ, su-
pra note 46, at 84-86 (stating that entitlements, such as AFDC, appear to subsidize women;
"male" subsidies, such as Medicare, Social Security, Workers' Compensation and unemployment
appear to be earned, not bestowed).
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merely equalizing the positions of men and women. Instead, it is
seen as preferring women to men, an inequality.158 Equality looks
unequal to those used to privileges. The privileged feel deprived, or
perceive the relative change in their status. Therefore, equality is
quite threatening to those who now hold the power.
A key social entitlement case is Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,159 brought by a man challenging an all-female nursing col-
lege. Mississippi University for Women was a compensatory institu-
tion, designed to offer women the education denied them in "real"
colleges. Its charter is a pantheon to traditional values and roles for
women and women's education.1 60 The state defended its admis-
sions policy as 1) giving women opportunities in a practical range of
education and 2) providing the advantages of single gender educa-
tion.161 This institution existed only because social limitations had
excluded women from participation in the mainstream. Ironically, a
male now claimed discrimination because he was excluded from par-
ticipating in the limited arena to which women had been con-fined. 16f
The Court found that the traditionally female occupation of nurs-
ing could notjustifiably be reserved for compensatory uses.1 63 But it
used a definition of gender classification which could only come
from a regime of gender inequality. The key, the Court said, was to
ascertain if the State's objective "reflects archaic and stereotypic no-
tions ... to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they
are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately
inferior... ,"164 An attempt to overcome just such "notions" was in-
appropriate without a history of disadvantage specific to the rem-
158. Justice Stevens, for example, cannot see how a statute could discriminate against both
men and women, or how a statute granting women benefits could discriminate against women.
Three types of marriages are examined byjusdce Stevens: "(1) those in which the husband is
dependent on the wife, (2) those in which the wife is dependent on the husband, and (3) those
in which neither spouse is dependent on the other." Under the first two situations, "the surviv-
ing male, unlike the surviving female, must undergo the inconvenience of proving dependency.
That surely is not a discrimination against females. In the third situation, if one spouse dies
benefits are payable to a surviving female but not to a surviving male. In my view, that is rather
blatant discrimination against males." Wengler, 446 U.S. at 154 (StevensJ., concurring).
159. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
160. Id. at 720 n.1.
161. Id at 721. These advantages were freedom from sexual distraction and freedom from
males intimidating and ovenvhelming female students. rd. at 727-28.
162. This sounds like a claim that it is discriminatory to exclude wealthy white landowners
from Native American reservations or from the "projects." Such claims expose the underlying
power playas the objective of the complaint.
163. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727.
164. Id. at 725.
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edy.165 Thus, women's low wages and less advantageous military po-
sitions justified wage protection 16 6 and extra time for military pro-
motion. 167 But women are nurses, and therefore do not need to be
helped to be nurses. Far from having erected barriers to women, the
nursing profession is historically virtually all female, creating barriers
for men which "tend[ ] to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing
as an exclusively woman's job.' 16 8 In a burst of generosity toward
women, the Court struck down the all-female school, striking a blow
against giving credibility to the old view and self-fulfilling prophecy
that nursing is a woman'sjob (for woman's lower pay) *169
This view is troubling. It accepts a premise of "equality" in educa-
tional and professional access which is built upon a status quo whose
premise is anything but equality. Therefore, it takes a compensatory
entitlement (admittedly a problematic concept anyway), and rather
than attacking the system of unfairness and power imbalance that
created the need for "gifts," it spreads the entitlement around. The
consequence is that equalizing entitlements leaves the original ine-
quality operating with full-and unmitigated-force. Although a sys-
tem which relegates women to the underpaid and undervalued nurs-
ing profession is invalid, the solution is not to inject enough men
into the profession to change its character and "earn" it social and
marketplace respect. There is nothing wrongwith being a "woman's
profession." The problem is deeper. It is that women are not re-
spected and therefore a woman's profession is not respected. 170
An equal society provides meaningful opportunities through in-
165. Id.
166. Id. at 728, citingCalifano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
167. The Court "recognized that, because women were barred from combat duty, they had
had fewer opportunities for promotion than their male counterparts. By allowing women an
additional four years to reach a particular rank before subjecting them to mandatory discharge,
the statute directly compensated [women] for other statutory barriers to advancement." Hogan,
458 U.S. at 728-29, citingSchlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
168. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729.
169. Id. at 729-30.
170. Having taught in both day care and law school, I am quite aware that one of the most
meaningful differences between that woman's profession and this "man's" profession are the
status and salary. That this reflects gender composition and gender role identity more than any
other factor is my inescapable conclusion. Yes, I have three years of legal education invested to
explain the difference. But I had about fifteen years of "on-the-job" training for day care as the
oldest of twelve children and a much-sought-after babysitter. Today, many day care teachers are
very highly trained.
The gendered nature of child rearing in this culture also explains the gendered composition
of the day care profession. Siegel, supra note 9, at 376. Given the historically nurturing role of
the nursing profession, and its subordination to the medical profession, it is not hard to figure
out why nursing is devalued in status as well as pay. Nurses (and day care professionals) look
like "mothers."
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clusive options. Currently, meaningful options appear to include
single-gender educational opportunities. All-female schools171 are
inclusive options (they do not deny equal access to the opportunities
beyond them, but tend to increase that access), whereas all-male
schools tend to be exclusive options (they distort access to opportu-
nities beyond them due to the disproportionate power their status
commands).172 By neglecting to consider the impact of society on
women, college and the workplace, the Supreme Court effectively
isolated the Mississippi University for Women from reality and then
imposed the ideal outcome on an anything but ideal world. Fur-
thermore, the Court equated distinction and difference (used to en-
hance women's education and opportunities) with discrimination
and inferiority. Gone is the search for invidious motive, usually re-
quired. To anyone with experience in reading equal protection
cases, especially those involving women, this is astounding.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun illuminated the underlying conflict
between respect for choice and imposed "pictures."173 Ultimately,
rules come from the powerful, and embody value choices. Rules im-
posed to deny non-mainstream options can destroy "values that
mean much to some people by forbidding the State to offer them a
choice while not depriving others of an alternative choice."174 As we
lose options, those who lose are not the powerful, whose preferred
options remain. Thus, the destruction of choice inherently disad-
vantages women and people of color, an observation brought home
in the abortion cases with ringing clarity.175
Justice Powell's dissent found no basis for limiting women's
choices because no deprivation of men's choices existed, and the
challenge was one based on personal convenience.17 6 The addi-
171. And perhaps all African-American schools.
172. This insight flows from Ronald Dworkin's depiction of the two types of equality. to be
treated equally (i.e. the same) or to be treated as an equal (and therefore potentially differ-
ently). See ELSENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 185 (describing Dworkin's ideas of equality). Focusing
upon the conequence of the proposed policy would enable us to see whether or not all-female
schools perpetuate female disadvantage or correct for it, or contribute to male disadvantage
measured againstfemale advantage (not measured against usual male privilege).
For an interesting example of the effectiveness of all-female schools, seeJudith H. Dobrzynski,
How to Succeed? Go to Wellesley, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1995, at Cl (chronicling the unparalleled
success of Wellesley graduates in breaking through the "glass ceiling").
173. 458 U.S. at 734 (BlacknunJ., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 112-13 (stating that "[c]hoice is structured, limited, and
in some sense predetermined; this is exactly what discrimination is about in the first place, the
limiting of a person's options.");J. Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 7, at 1564, 1631-33; Nsiah-
Jefferson, supra note 78, at 16.
176. Se 458 U.S. at 742 nn.10-11 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that Hogan could attend
other nursing schools, even though theywere not as close to where he wanted to be).
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tional choice given women was unobjectionable in itself. Further,
single-gender education might help free women from the very limits
society has placed on them such as silence, passivity,17 7 and mating
behavior. 178 Justice Powell appears to understand that the problem
with limiting choices is a problem of exclusion, not a problem of dif-
ference. The Court's ruling does not ensure equality on the basis of
difference. Rather, by the forced inclusion of men in one context, it
perpetuates the societal exclusion of women, while purporting to
disrupt it.
c. Summary
Women have been denied the civic responsibilities that might earn
them respect on the basis that their reproductive capacity and sup-
posed moral and intellectual incapacities make them unsuitable for
fulfilling those responsibilities without risking the future of the fam-
ily and the society. Part of women's incapacity to fulfill responsibili-
ties is created by the very refusal to view them as worthy of rights and
power. To have and fulfill responsibility, one needs power. Rights
can be a source of power.
Denying rights or responsibilities to women has effectively kept
women insulated from power and from respect. In the guise of pro-
tecting women from responsibility for decisions, the Court actually
kept women from power and helped ensure their subjugation. Ig-
noring women's contributions makes it look like women do not bear
their fair share of societal responsibilities, and that they are thus not
entitled to power and respect. Returning the power of decision to
women would upset the scheme of female inferiority. Thus, the
privilege and entitlement cases persist in seeing women as nonpow-
erful beings, and contribute to restricting women's access to mean-
ingful power and choice.
3. Women as Social Beings
The last type of case involving women explicitly deals with
women's social roles. These cases illuminate the untenable relation-
ship between our views of women and our views of equality.179
177. Id. at 737-39 (referring to studies which indicate that single-sex education programs
encourage women to speak in class and free them from the role of the "pursued sex") (Powell,
J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. The rules challenged in these cases are premised upon the nineteenth century notion
of the separate, inferiorsphere of domesticity as women's, the superior sphere of public life and
service as men's. In these cases, the rules assist in governing the sphere of women and their
roles within it, rather than in governing the public sphere. The pattern of recognizing inequal-
ity only when it apparently disadvantages men repeats itself in this context.
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RHETORIC OF DISRESPECT
The social role of males and females in reproduction is well-
illustrated in two contrasting cases. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,180 the
Court struck down a state law which decreed that male "career
criminals" were subject to sterilization. In so doing, the Court was
far more concerned with preserving Skinner's control over his own
fertility and procreative capacity than with protecting marriage, the
family, or the society. Thus, male fertility was protected for its own
importance to the male. 18 1 Conversely, female control of fertility is
either subject to state control,182 or viewed as protected within the
context of marriage, family, and to a lesser extent, heterosexual rela-
tions.183 In Buck v. Bel4 the Supreme Court upheld a law permitting
sterilization of a female of allegedly diminished mental capacity, with
Justice Holmes's ringing endorsement that "three generations of
imbeciles is enough." 8 4
The Court treats male fertility as of primary and overriding impor-
tance to the individual male, while treating female fertility as a sub-
ject of concern to others, including society, and thus more appropri-
ately subject to external controls. The significant problem of
sterilization abuse among women-primarily African-American, Na-
tive American, and Latina 18 5 -is testament to this belief that female
fertility should not be within the private control of a woman, but un-
der the control of society.
Less dramatically, women's social roles in the family are intimately
connected with the need for the institution of alimony. Yet, in Orr v.
Oft a law requiring alimony only from husband to wife was struck
down because the male "bears a burden he would not bear were he
female," and thus the law "expressly discriminates against men rather
than women."18 6 Although prompted, the Court dismissed the fact
that such a scheme ultimately rested upon devaluing and harming
women, not men. 187 The Court relegated such realities to history,
asserting that women no longer face removal from the world of work,
180. 816 U.S. 585, 536 (1942) (finding that the statute deprived certain individuals of a
"right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have offspring").
181. Id.
182. Buckv. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
183. Sesecdon III C infra.
184. 274 U.S. at 207.
185. See ANGEIA DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CMAss (1981); HARTMANN, supra note 3, at 254-
55; ROSAIND PETcHES, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALify AND
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 178-82 (rev. ed. 1990).
186. 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
187. Md.
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and thus society need not make "their designated place 'secure." ' 18 8
Yet, the opinion fails to portray women's roles as co-equal, vital and
legitimate. The reasoning and language is devoid of recognizing in-
terdependence. The male role of breadwinner (now opened to fe-
males) is still identified as the benchmark of success and superior-
ity.189 Alimony is an adjunct to a male world. The Court never
sheds those boundaries in addressing its equal distribution.19 0 In-
deed, the harm done to males by the challenged system is that of un-
fairness to those who are dependent-functionally female-and thus
are left unaided.191 Alimony remains a payment to victims from
non-victims. 192
Confronted with schemes based upon gender stereotypes, the
Court frequently reaches a good result on a path of stereotyped rea-
soning about the dependence and victimization of those in a wifely
role. Rather than respecting women and women's social roles, it
compensates the men who share in women's traditional economic
degradation. Three of the most famous gender equality cases, Reed
v. Reed,193 Frontiero v. Richardson,19 4 and Craig v. Boren,195 follow suit.
188. Id. at 280 n.9. The Court's discussion -consistently refers to the dichotomies of inde-
pendence and dependence, workplace-salaried and domestic-undervalued, and uses male and
female roles to explain these dichotomies. Nonetheless, it treats them as rhetorical only, and
denies their real-life impact.
Interestingly, the women most likely to have matched the profile of the separate spheres ideal
are those most likely to have husbands whose income could support alimony. Blindness to dif-
fering social realities persists in this rhetoric and in the decision and its consequences.
189. See, e.g., LucindaM. F'mley, TranscendingEquality Theoy, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1118
(1986) (stating that while society views males in the role of worker and breadwinner, it views
females in the role of childbearer and rearer); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference,
and Child Custody, 80 CAL L. REV. 615, 672 n.172 (1992).
190. E.sENSrEN, supra note 40, at 71.
191. Orr, 440 U.S. at 282.
192. Having clarified that alimony is either protection for victims or victimizes its payors, the
Court patronizingly observes that alimony's "compensatory purpose may be effectuated without
placing burdens solely on husbands." Id, (emphasis added). Fairness becomes a "burden" here;
alimony is a "gift," not earned by the spouse who fulfilled her role and supported the family's
earning power and potential. Cf SusAN MOLLER OKIN,jUsTICE, GENDERAND THE FAMILY, 170,
176, 180-81 (1989) (arguing that women fulfilling their domestic roles are integral to men being
able to function in the workplace and maximize their earnings; thus, both women and men
should be considered as having mutually earned the marital income).
193. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
194. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
195. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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Supportive of the abstract principle of gender equality,19 6 each gives
short shrift to women and their value as social participants. Despite
repeated opportunities, the Court remains insensitive to disrespect
for women, and unable to infuse a premise of respect for women
into the equal protection analysis of gender discrimination.
4. Summary
Supreme Court rhetoric shows disrespect for women and their
ability to make choices for themselves or others. Disrespect gener-
ates the felt need to preserve women's designated reproductive, fam-
ily and social roles by protecting them out of rights and responsibili-
ties. Childbearing becomes inseparable from being a "woman," and
childbearing and decisionmaking are considered mutually exclusive
capacities. Women who fill the role of mother are viewed as passive
participants in sex, reproduction, childbearing and childrearing.
They confer no benefits, bear no burdens, and deserve no support
for fulfilling these roles. They simply fulfill their "destiny." Women
196. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1979) (striking down automatic preferences for males as
administrators of estates). The Court treated this case as an abstract problem of gender-based
distinctions with no reasons to support them. Fronteiro v. Richardson, 441 U.S. 677 (1973), also
escaped emotional content when the Court set up separate sphere ideology as a "straw man"
easily disposed oE The Court's analysis remained stuck at the superficial level of cages and ped-
estals, breadwinners and dependents. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court con-
centrated upon explicating its "intermediate scrutiny" standard in assessing the legitimacy of the
reasons the State offered for having differing ages (21 for male, 18 for female) for drinking
beer. But the very marginality of the discrimination to the core reasons for enforced gender
differences made the case easy. The Court did not need to confront the internal, value-laden
structures of gender role distinctions, which allowed those structures to remain invisible and
insusceptible to challenge and rejection. In fact, the Court overlooked one likely impetus be-
hind the law, i.e., matching younger females to older males, assisting in perpetuating female
subordination. Contrary tojustice Stevens' belief that the law treated males as inferior, 429 U.S.
at 213-14, it helped perpetuate male superiority.
Similar to Craig, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), challenged a divorce agreement that
provided for support to cease at age 18, despite a Utah statute making females adult at 18, but
males adult at 21. The Court saw that the age distinction was a proxy for a social scheme in
which females were destined to marry young, pursue domestic responsibilities, need no higher
education, and, unspoken, to move quickly into being dependent upon their husbands rather
than their fathers. Id at 10. The scheme helped insure women's continuing dependence, by
expecting it and withdrawing the parental support that might aid in obtaining the education
necessary to function in the marketplace and the world of ideas. This role-typing was deemed
illegitimate, especially because women's "adulthood" conferred no advantages (e.g., votingjury
duty), but only disadvantages (e.g., earlier marriage and lack of parental support). Stanton, 421
U.S. at 16-16.
Yet, the Court still missed the fact that these roles and stereotypes had more to do with men's
roles and the supporting nature of the roles carved out for women. Thus, to preserve the tradi-
tional roles, it is less important that women are expected to be dependent than it is that men
who want dependent women be able to get them younger and with fewer skills and options. See
Catharine MacKinnon, Dfferenm andDominance, in fflwNIST LEGAL THeOR supra note 45, at 81
(explicating the theory that gender inequality is a result of gender subordination, and that an
analysis accepting the premise that difference and sameness wi balance inequality is inherently
flawed and incapable of changing women's inferior status to men).
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who attempt to fill other roles, however, defy their own natures and
threaten the moral and social structure. Defining women through
their reproductive capacity, the Court then uses it to isolate them,
authorizing special rules that disadvantage women, but seldom up-
holding schemes that assist women in achieving equality in an une-
qual world.
Women's "diminished capacities" also preclude them from being
viewed as appropriate holders of rights and power. Women are
"protected" out of responsibilities, then deemed unworthy recipients
of benefits and support. Gender equality is achieved by ensuring
that males suffer no disadvantage to females, but disadvantageous
treatment of females appears to be "neutral," and is upheld as re-
flecting the natural differences incorporated into social structures,
especially the military and the family.
The Court treats women in inconsistent ways. What remains vital
and consistent however is the underlying attitude: disrespect. It is
this vision of women that the Court carries into its deliberations and
pronouncements on privacy and abortion rights.
Im. THE PRIVACY CASES: THE BATTLE BETWEEN STATE AND
INDIVIDUAL CONTROL
A. Introduction
Women's right to decide upon abortion as a reproductive choice
has rested upon the Supreme Court's recognition of a more general
"right of privacy."197 The Court did not use explicit Constitutional
language to name this right, e.g., "right to liberty." Such a powerful
linguistic statement reflects the marginalized status that the interests
of family relationships, interests the Court (and society) has explic-
itly assigned to women, hold.198 I believe this accounts for (1) the
marginal Constitutional status accorded to the area of reproductive
choice, (2) the discomfort with which the Court confronts and re-
solves these issues, (3) the exclusion and isolation of women en-
forced and reinforced by the Court's decisions, and (4) the fragility
of the commitment to and understanding of the place of such inter-
ests in society and Constitutional doctrine.
Re-reading the privacy and abortion cases reveals why the process
197. Eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
198. Eg., Taub & Schneider, supra note 112, at 117; Polan, supra note 112, at 294; J. sil-
liams, Gender Wars, supra note 7, at 1565 (contending thatwhere men were expected to be active
participants in society, feminine virtue was reserved for the private sphere of the home); Siegel,
supra note 9, at 335 (proposing that the law imposes the role of parenting upon women).
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of withholding pragmatic availability and withdrawing constitutional
succor for women's reproductive choices is being accomplished with
such ease and alacrity. Simply stated, constitutional succor for re-
productive choice was never a commitment. As demonstrated below,
the right of privacy always contained within itself the distrust of
women and their decisions evident in recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. 19 9
As the following analysis demonstrates, privacy grew up protecting
existing power in the family sphere.20 0 The principle extended itself
to the length of its logic-to cover intimate relational choices includ-
ing reproduction and procreation: first for men,20 1 then for married
couples, 202 and finally for unmarried women.203 But reproductive
choice gave women the power to make and effectuate significant
moral decisions.20 4 Because privacy was never intended to empower
women or respect women's moral capacity to make decisions, the re-
ality that women have the power to make and implement reproduc-
tive decisions has proven unsettling. It has thus become necessary to
attack this power of women by removing any vestiges of power and
respect from the right. It has become more important to withdraw
199. .&g., Rusty. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding a "gag rule" preventing federally.
funded physicians from informing pregnant women of the availability of abortion as one op-
tion); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (expressing a fear that
women will use abortion as a means of birth control).
200. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 112, at 117; Polan, supra note 112, at 294; and infra
discussing Meyerand Phan
201. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that marriage and procreation are
fundamental rights in the context of the attempted forced sterilization of a male prisoner); con-
tra Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding that mentally retarded women may be forcibly
sterilized).
202. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the privacy of a marriage
includes the right to use contraception).
203. Eg., Eisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that contraception must be avail-
able to single women as a matter of equal protection).
204. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (emphasizing the moral nature of the choice). Abortion is "unique" because it is
"fraughtwith consequences to others." Id. at 874.
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the power than to overturn the right.205
Rights are generally accompanied by legal respect and are usually
effective in empowering individual actors. In a legal world without
respect for women's moral judgments, rights can disempower
women. Rights analysis contains two different components. The
first is the substantive recognition of the right. The second is the proc-
ess of determining if the right has been improperly restricted by the
State's action in light of the State's valid goals. The process of rights-
based analysis is hierarchical, abstract and isolationist.2 0 6 The power
of connection, context and relationship, necessary for mature peo-
205. SeeWebster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In both cases, the Court "reaffirms" the right announced in Roe v.
Wade, while allowing virtually every state-devised inroad upon its exercise. By withholding the
power to decide and to control the decision from women, and vesting it in the State, the Court
has effectively undermined women's power while rhetorically preserving women's right. Se also
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, at 27 (saying that with an "undue burden" test, the Court has pre-
served a right for "the well-to-do, rationally calculating, iron-willed woman"). While the right of
privacy remains, the ability of women to exercise that right by choosing to terminate a preg-
nancy becomes more and more illusory. Physician training in abortion has declined to the point
where some abortion providers fear the medical, service may become functionally unavailable.
Abortion services are not provided in many hospitals supported by pullic funds or by the Catho-
lic Church, and such hospitals comprise a huge percentage of hospitals nationwide. The major-
ity of rural counties in the United States have no abortion providers; some states have but one
or two. The available providers are subject to anti-choice activities ranging from protests staged
near them to clinic-blocking, patient harassment, worker harassment (including death threats
and residential protests), bomb threats, bombs, sniper fire, and murder (of clinic workers and
volunteers). See supra, notes 3,5 and accompanying text.
Thus, the legal right coexists with a practical inaccessibility for many desiring the services and
a growing lack of dose, accessibly priced, private and safe (from external violence and harass-
ment) services. The removal of financial assistance to patients complicates such limited access.
At this point, most women have limited power to make and effectuate a choice with respect to
their pregnancies, despite the Supreme Court's rhetorically powerful defense of their "right" in
the Casyjoint opinion and despite some legal commentators' high opinion of the joint opinion
and its effectiveness in laying to rest the issue of whether the Constitution will continue to pro-
tect liberty/privacy by preservingwomen's "right" to choose abortion. Seesupranote 2.
206. The hierarchical, abstract, and isolationist quality of modem rights-based analysis has
been pointed out by many commentators. GLENDON, supra note 9 (arguing that the discourse
of rights encourages isolated individualism and exclusion of multiplicitous interests);
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, at 27 (proposing that rights analysis separates the interested parties
from each other and places them into conflict); Larry R. Churchill &Jos6J. Simin, Abortion and
theRhetoic oflndividualights, 12 HASTNGS CENiER REP. 9 (Feb. 1982) (arguing that legal rights
analysis is too narow and simplistic for ethical decisionmaking, as it focuses too much on ato-
mistic analysis); Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited:. Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist
Jurispudence 65 S. CAL. L REv. 1171 (1992) (claiming that the modem liberalisms of Rawls and
Dworkin are not purely atomistic models, but recognize human interconnections as essential to
justice reasoning; noting, however, that rights create isolation to protect space for individuals);
Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in theFamily: ForBabyJaneDoe, 18 U. MICH.J. L. REP. 933
(1985) (explaining that rights analysis establishes an abstract conflict which obscures ambiguity
and allows arguments devoid of context, creating isolation); Elizabeth Schneider, Rights Discourse
and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L. REV. 151, 154, 166, 172 (1988) (describing rights as a
"trump" to keep society out, which reduce factual complexity to a two-sided conflict); West, su-
pra note 32, at 43 (stating that rights analysis is based upon a thesis of individualism, that people
are insulated from society, that it creates hierarchies that remain unchallenged; and that it uses
abstract rather than contextual reasoning).
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ple to make individual moral judgments, can also be negated by this
process of rights analysis. 207 Therefore, the power of a woman's
right can easily be trumped by explicitly recognizing the woman's
low position in any hierarchy of moral being. This hierarchy in-
cludes the State, parents (father),2 08 male mate (husband and
"father-to-be"), the fetus, and even the community. Thus, the failure
to respect women leads to a devaluing of the substantive right they
seek to enforce, permitting the apparently neutral process of rights
analysis to disempower women.
B. The Beginnings ofPrivay: Meyer and Pierce
The right to privacy as a liberty interest was first recognized in
Meyer v. Nebraskas09 and Pierce v. S&ciety of Sisters.2 10 These cases de-
veloped privacy within the context of the family and parental control
over the upbringing of children.
The Meyer opinion cast its protection of liberty in terms that are of
critical importance to understanding the right of privacy as it now
exists. Privacy was a right of control and dominion: "the power of par-
ents to control the education of their own."2 11 Despite recognizing a
link between liberty and intimate choice, the Court chose power,
control and the dominion of ownership to define the essence of the
207. See GILUGAN, supra note 38 (arguing that mature moral judgment requires the use of
both "justice" based (rights) reasoning and "care" based (responsibility) reasoning); GLENDON,
supra note 11; Churchill & Simdn, supra note 206, at 9; Minow, supra note 206, at 933
(demonstrating how the State's protection of rights may intervene in the sphere of family deci-
sionmaking); West, supra note 32, at 61 (proposing that modem republicanism, as a combina-
tion of communal morality and a rejection of civic homogeneity, is better suited for resolving
such issues as those involved in reproductive choice).
208. Current legislative attempts to require that both parents of a minor consent to an abor-
tion seem fairly explained as ensuring male input into the decision, input not guaranteed by a
single parent's consent, as that parent is likely female.
209. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Myer, the plaintiff challenged a state law prohibiting the
teaching of modem languages in school. The state defended the law because of the impor-
tance of the "mother tongue" to the hearts of children in transmitting American ideals. The
plaintif's argument largely rested upon teadhe rights, those more readily associated with the
previously recognized liberties of "freedom from bodily restraint, to contract, to engage in the
occupations of life, (and] to acquire useful knowledge." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. The Court,
however, while recognizing teachers' rights, id. at 400-01, focused strongly upon parental (and
to a much lesser extent children's) rights: "to marry, establish a home and bring up children."
Id. at 399. Importantly, this list continued, recognizing the more intimate right of the choice
"to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience ... essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness." I& (emphasis added). The Court relied upon explicit language from the
Constitution as well-in due process liberty. Id.
210. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a state law that prohibited private schooling of chil-
dren).
211. Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,401 (1923) (emphasis added).
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right.2 1 2 Privacy is thus allied more with property analysis than with
fundamental tenets of human dignity.
The Pierce litigation challenged a law against private schooling.215
The plaintiff sought to base the right in the "essence of personal lib-
erty and freedom" which made "the child of man... his parents' child
and not the state's."214 In this argument, "rights" is synonymous
with "control," and "privacy" means simply "parental power." The
state itself characterized the issue as being about the "superior right
to control" citizens and children.2 15
Interestingly, the state argued that it needed to use its power to
achieve a very connective and communitarian goal of breaking down
the barriers of race, sect, class and ethnicity by educating all children
together.2 16 The Court chose to pursue the values of separation and
control.217 Parents were empowered not because of respect for in-
timate decisionmaking but because of deference to "direct[ing]"
those "under their control."2 18 The connection argument was re-
jected as a threat to "standardize ... the child [as] the mere creature
of the state."219 Parental direction was good because it separated
children into their "station in life"2 20 and taught them their
"additional obligations." 221
Liberty inevitably involves allocating power between the State and
212. Id. at 400-01. In recognizing family power, the Court accepted the eistingpower struc-
ture as inviolate. However one would prefer to view the "individual" power accorded within the
family, that power was exercised by the male "head" of the household. See Taub & Schneider,
supra note 112, at 117; Polan, supra note 112, at 294.
213. Pkrc 268 U.S. at530.
214. Id at518 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 524.
216. Id. at 525.
217. Although I agree with the result in Pierce, I am critiquing the basis upon which the
Court chose to reach that result. The Court could have recognized and fostered the goals of
personal liberty in decisions affecting intimates, and thus recognized the value of connections,
while deciding that private schooling (which shared with public schooling the responsibility for
transmitting civic values) did not threaten community because it supported pluralism. Such
recognition would also have helped to solve the current conundrum of assimilation or multicul-
turalism. Pluralistic liberty does not enforce assimilation, it recognizes the importance of family
and heritage to the formation of the individual identity which liberty is designed to protect. A
focus upon pluralistic and intimate liberty, rather than upon control in the domestic sphere,
would have provided a sounder basis for recognizing the constitutional necessity of liberty for
personal choices.
218. Mere-, 268 U.S. at534-35.
219. I& at 535.
220. Mker, 262 U.S. at 400.
221. Piercp, 268 U.S. at 535.
RHETORIC OF DISRESPECr
the individual.222 The Court's concern about power is not objec-
tionable in and of itself. The sole focus upon power, and the equa-
tion of power with control, i.e., with the ability and permission to co-
erce, is problematic. 223 So too is the Court's inability to merge the
concerns about power with the values of intimacy and choice. Meyer
and Pierce reveal a Court that contrasts the idea of power with that of
protection for intimate decisions, a Court that perceives its task as
choosing between protecting control and protecting intimate connec-
tions.224 Allocating power to individuals as a vehicle for achieving
protection of pluralistic personal choices is much different from the
path the Court chose. The Court allocated power-manifested as
control-as an end in itself.
Unsurprisingly, power identified as control over decisions of social
consequence is perceived as a threat to the very idea of the State.225
Thus, at least one critic characterizes the right of privacy as "greedy"
and virtually unlimited, amounting to an anarchic claim: "the right
to be let alone is ultimately the right not to be governed."226 Privacy
as power and control may be susceptible to this criticism, but privacy
as intimate liberty is not.227 To the extent that privacy as control is
anarchic, it is also a dangerous right. It is not surprising that there is
little respect for or trust in such a right. But privacy for intimate lib-
erty has an important claim to respect. To adopt this vision would
allow respect to form one of the premises of privacy law, replacing
the distrust evident in Carl Schneider's attitude228 (and that of sev-
eral Supreme Courtjustices) toward it.
Using power to protect liberty, rather than as synonymous with lib-
erty, would enhance the values of intimacy and personal choice as
constitutive of true liberty. If the end is liberty, protecting power is a
222. Whenever the Court examines a claim that a state action infringes upon a right, it nec-
essarily engages in delineating the boundary between the State's power to coerce or prohibit an
individual action and the individual's power to decide how to act on his or her own.
223. Such a focus is quite limited, and perceives power almost solely in physical terms, ignor-
ing the importance to liberty of the human dimensions of having and exercising a positive
power to create one's self and influence one's world (a power of vast internal and psychological
importance to one's development as afree person).
224. So supra text accompanying notes 211-21, demonstrating how, in the end, the Court
ignored the impact of intimate decisionmaking when making its decision and explaining its ba-
sis for those decisions.
225. Carl E. Schneider, State Inerest Anaysis in Fourtenth Amendment "Pdrvacy" Law: An Essay
on the Constitutionalzation of SocialIssues, 51 LAW & CoNTmiP. PROBS. 79 (1988).
226. Id.at87.
227. Whereas the idea of the State may well be to exert social control over individuals to the
end that government may exist [Hobbes], the idea of the liberal democratic state includes es-
tablishing an environment in which individuals are accorded liberties in order to achieve the
selfhood and fulfillment thatjustifies forming a government at all. Cf. McClain, supranote 206.
228. ee Schneider, supra note 225.
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means, but not the essence of the constitutional guarantee.
229
Rather than relying upon power and control within the private
sphere of the family, the Court could have relied upon the need for
individualized choices in the intimate sphere of training or becom-
ing a person. Meyer and Pierce involved educating children in their
ethnic or religious heritage, without preventing the children from
receiving the common education for civic responsibility given to all
children. Thus, the Court could have protected pluralism within
citizenship, as well as protecting personal decisions about family up-
bringing which are important to the development of personality but
which do not threaten isolation and removal from the larger society.
Given the choice to recognize that liberty values connection, inti-
mate relationships, and core personal choices, the Court instead
used a model of confrontation and isolation. "Liberty" was reduced
to "privacy," and this privacy interest became entangled in a rhetoric
of power, control, and conflict.23 0 By choosing this vision of privacy,
the Court laid a foundation that fosters distrust for privacy and its
exercise, rather than respect for privacy as fundamental to liberty.
The stage had been well set.
C. Privacy in the Bedroom
The second strand of privacy precedent deals explicitly with inti-
mate choices. However, rather than centering its decisions upon the
protection liberty requires for moral choice, the Court has chosen to
organize its thoughts around the social status of the decisionmakers
and the place in which the decisions are manifested.23 1 Thus, the
Court chose to extend its protection of the family by protecting the
marital bedroom from undue state invasion in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.232 Both the Court's reasoning and its protection of privacy were
229. The essence of libertyis what it means to the selfhood and fulfillment of the individuals
who comprise a free society, and therefore what it means to the society itself. "Liberty" is a de-
fining characteristic of how Americans view our political system. It may be that to protect such
liberty, we need to accord the power to pursue it to individuals. But that power then becomes
the means to achieving the end of liberty, rather than being synonymous with liberty itself.
230. This conflict was both between adopting mainstream or minority ideas and choices and
between designating superior versus inferior decisionmakers to make those choices.
231. By choosing social status and place (home/family) as its organizing principles, the
Court incorporates thought patterns and premises harmful and disrespectful to women as
equals. Sm Taub & Schneider, supra note 112, at 117 (arguing that "privacy" protects the status
which already exists in the family, i.e., that of the dominant male and subordinate female. By
shielding the place of home/fiamily from legal scrutiny, the Court's privacy precedents have ef-
fectively sanctioned this power relationship and inequality.); Polan, supra note 112, at 294
(noting that the use of the public/private dichotomy in the privacy decisions such as Roe and
Griswold has permitted law to shun the domain in which female subjugation is socially repro-
duced).
232. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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initially confined to marital decisionmaking with respect to sexuality
in the bedroom.
This strand of privacy jurisprudence, like the first strand, did not
develop to protect liberty and intimate relationships. In the bed-
room cases, the Court delicately doses its eyes from mutually embar-
rassing intrusions into what it was unwilling to see, but was willing to
allow fairly mainstream sexual activity.23 3 Respect for personal ac-
tivities and choices never grounded the analysis. The Court merely
condemned the State's role as a Peeping Tom and professed its own
distaste for playing voyeur.234 Once again, the core logic revolves
around power,235 not intimacy or moral agency. Bowers v. Hard-
wick?36 clarified this fundamental truth about privacy doctrine by
shunning the idea that intimate personal relationships are protected
by privacy doctrine237 and sanctioning intrusions into bedrooms and
sexual relationships within them that do not conform to the main-
stream. The Court insisted that there was "[n]o connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual
activity on the other."2 3
8
The Court, as in Meyer and Pierce, is protecting accepted power re-
lations, not intimacy. Sexuality and reproduction are not seen as
private choices deserving of legal respect and room. Constitutional
233. The Court showed no compunction when upholding prohibitions against homosexual
seual activity, discovered by actual physical intrusion into the bedroom during the sexual act,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in contrast to the delicacy displayed when the intru-
sion might involve imagining what occurred in marital bedrooms. Gris od 381 U.S. at 485.
234. Grisrwo!, 381 U.S. at 485.
235. That power is the existing power relation within marriage (Griswold recognized contra-
ceptive control as a married interest) and in male/female bedrooms, or "appropriately, male
bedrooms. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (protecting the possession and use of
pornography in a bedroom). See also MacKinnon, supra note 45, at 163; Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Pomography asDefamation and Disciminaaio, 71 B.U. L REV. 793 (1991); ANDREA DWORKIN;
PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981) (asserting the role of pornography in perpetu-
ating male dominance over women).
236. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
237. I& at 191 (stating that "[a]ny claim that [the privacy] cases ... stand for the proposition
that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated
from state proscription is unsupportable." [Indeed, Mr. Hardwick was physically intruded upon
in his bedroom during police attempts to "serve" a no-longer-outstanding warrant for failing to
appear in court on a citation. See Leslie Bender & Dan Bravermen, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LW.
A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 320-21 (1995) (discussing PEER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR
CONVICTONS: SIXTEENAMERCANSiHO FOUGHTTHEIRWAYTO THE SUPREME COURT (1990)]).
Cf Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (refusing to recognize in-
timate fRmily relationships as a basis for empowering choice in the more "public" setting of the
provision of medical care to a dying patient).
238. Bowes, 478 U.S. at 191. See also Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973)
(stating that StanLywas decided by holding that "[a] man's home is his castle"). Apparently, this
holds true only if the man is acting "like a man" by fulfilling a social role of heading a household
which contains a female as a sexual partner.
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protection, rather, is for traditional social roles. When sexual or re-
productive choices threaten social roles, the Court resists or fails to
protect those decisions. Indeed, the choice to discard traditional so-
cial roles is treated as a basis for questioning the decisionmaker's
moral capacity to make respected choices. 23 9 Thus, even commit-
ted 240 homosexual lovers have no status or place deserving protec-
tion, because the Court refuses to allow them to exercise power and
completely mistrusts them. Their social role and status identifies
them as immoral, anti-social actors, thus incapable of commanding
respect as moral agents exerting decisionmaking capacity.2
4 1
By protecting the married couple's right to obtain contraception
in consultation with their physician, the Court did expand the pri-
vacy concept of Pierce to include more than tangibly social decisions
about childrearing. Justice Douglas referred to the intangibles of
ideas and beliefs as expressed in the intimate marital relation.242
This confluence supported reading Griswold as protecting the choice
of relationship and of reproductive conduct in that relationship.
Side by side with this analysis, however, is an analysis that carries the
seeds of destruction, questioning private choices that do not adhere
to social expectations.
Griswold emphasizes the social role and value of the marital rela-
tionship.2 43 It shuts the State out of the bedroom, rather than out
of the choice to reproduce. The alarming spectre of physical intru-
sion to observe contraception in action motivates the sense of pri-
239. For instance, minor women's choices to engage in premarital sex, while apparently suit-
ing them for motherhood (they can obtain prenatal care on their own), disqualify them from
making an unsupervised moral decision to have an abortion (which would relieve them of their
natural role of motherhood). See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding that a
Utah statute requiring a physician to notify, if possible, the parents of a minor seeking an abor-
tion). Indigent women on Medicaid, generally stereotyped as young, single mothers-"welfare
queens"-are also deemed incapable of making good moral decisions without "assistance" from
the state in asserting the morally preferable option of childbirth and reinforcing it by withhold-
ing funding for abortions, but not for childbirth. See, e.g., Harris v, .McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1976) (holding that a state may choose not to pay an indigent
woman's expenses associated with a nontheraputic abortions, while choosing to fund expenses
associatedw ith childbirth as a matter of policy).
240. Bowers itself involved a casual sexual encounter. However, the Court declared that no
homosexual relationships were entitled to constitutional protection.
241. See Bower, 478 U.S. at 192 (upholding the use of a sodomy statute enforced against
homosexuals alone by detailing the traditional legal repulsion toward and moral reprehensibility
of homosexual conduct. "Proscriptions against [homosexual] conduct have ancient roots" and
are valid even when "based on notions of morality"). See also i at 196-97 (Burger, J., concur-
ring) (stating that "fc]ondemnation of [homosexual conduct] is firmly rooted in Judeao-
Christian moral and ethical standards." English law recognized itas an "'infamous crime against
nature' ... an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape"); id. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring)
(refusing to "cast aside millenia of moral teaching" to recognize Mr. Hardwick's libertyinterest).
242. Griswo 381 U.S. at488.
243. Id. at 483-88.
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vacy.244 The evil of the state law is its "destructive impact upon [the
marital] relationship."245 That relationship is worthy of protection
because of its primacy in the social order as well as in the accepted
moral order: "a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an asso-
ciation that promotes a way of life ... a harmony in living ... a bilat-
eral loyalty ... for as noble a purpose as any ... -"246 The Court pro-
tects a social construct, the "sacred precinct of the marital
bedroom."247 Intimate moral choices or respect for them are pe-
ripheral in Griswold; at its core, it conserves the social role of mar-
riage and excludes the State from intruding into bedrooms, not into
choices. 24 8 Importantly, Griswold did not vest power in the moral
decisionmaker, it simply divested the State of power and left it to the
status quo.
In fact, Justice Goldberg's concurrence concedes that the State has
the power to make certain, otherwise moral, choices (e.g., about
marital fidelity) for people. He considers the ultimate goal of pri-
vacy protection (evidenced by allowing a compelling state interest to
override it) to be preservation of traditional social roles, in this case,
marriage.24 9
The dissenters in Griswold ignore the issue of private decisionmak-
ing, and concentrate on using judicial power to override the legisla-
tive choice barring the use of contraceptives. 250 This reveals that the
debate is not over recognizing the need to respect moral decisions,
but is about power. Rules of power and social control decided the
entire case. Griswold limited State power on the basis of protecting
the status of marriage.2 51 A privacy jurisprudence based upon re-
244. Id. at 485.
245. I4
246. I&
247. Giswo 881 U.S. at 485.
248. William iu, Abortion and the Social System, in ABORTION: NEv DiruCoNs FOR PoLIc'
STUDIES 137, 150 (Edward Manier, William Liu, & David Solomon eds., 1977) (noting that pri-
vacy rhetoric, based in the marital relationship, is a very limited and exclusive rhetoric, ignoring
the communal dimensions of moral values).
Justice Goldberg concurring in Gyiswold also emphasized social roles and the place of marital
relations--"the important and sensitive area of privacy ... the marital relation and the marital
home ... the private realm of family life ... the traditional relation of the family." Griswo[4 381
U.S. at 495-98 (GoldbergJ., concurring). He, too, was concerned more with excluding the
state from the bedroom than with preserving individual moral agency.
249. Id. at 498 (GoldbergJ., concurring). See also David M. Smolin, Why Abortion Rights Are
NotJcstied By Reference to Gender Equalily: A Response to Professor Tribe, 23J. MARSHAML L. REV. 621
(1990) (claiming that because privacy law only protects traditional family values, restrictions on
abortion are consistent with it).
250. G iiwol 81 U.S. at507-08 (BlackJ., dissenting).
251. Id. at491.
195FaB! 1996]
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
spect would find that the State has no power to intrude into inti-
macy, personhood, or moral agency. It would affirmatively support
individuals making moral choices, recognizing this power out of re-
spect for its value.
The protection of the bedroom was also a key factor in Stanley v.
C-orgia.252 Interestingly, the Court determined in this case that pri-
vacy protected space, feelings, ideas, and possessions, 253 but the es-
sence of that privacy was limiting State intrusion into the bedroom,
where one owned one's own thoughts and activities.254 Power to ex-
clude, rather than power to decide in matters of intimacy and moral-
ity, thus remained critical to privacy jurisprudence, as did property
concepts.
A crucial challenge to privacy protection arose when unmarried,
and even minor, persons sought the right to use contraceptives in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.255 The sacred precincts of family and marriage,
the o nly acknowledged status for private reproductive decisionmak-
ing,25 6 were no longer at stake. Prior privacy analysis provided little
foundation for such a right, because moral choices about forming
familial relationships, intimacy, and sexuality257 had not been rec-
ognized. The decision to protect contraceptive choice outside of the
marital bedroom could have been based upon privacy analysis if the
Court had recognized that privacy necessarily leaves to the person
(not the State) the decisions as to with whom one will share an inti-
mate relationship. Contraception merely effectuates intimate
choices as to both sharing sexuality with another and creating the in-
tense personal relationship of parent/child. However, privacy analy-
sis had not recognized the core of intimacy and moral respect, leav-
ing singles vulnerable to State intrusion because their unmarried
status had no inherent power.
The Court finessed this muddle by concentrating on the sexual ac-
tivity of singles as being functionally similar to the sexual activity of
252. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Citing the right to be let alone, Justice Marshall for the majority
decried criminalizing private-i.e., in the home, in the bedroom-possession of pornography.
Id- at 559,561. The FirstAmendment protection for ideas and expression protected the home
from invasion, especially because it was being used in ways that the Court deemed had no public
repercussions.
253. Id at 564.
254. Id at568.
255. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking
down a lawwhich criminalized the sale or distribution of contraceptives).
256. But see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the Court was more inter-
ested in preserving Skinner's control over his own fertility and procreative capacity than in pro.
tecting a marriage or a family.
257. In the author's opinion, sexuality includes control over fertility.
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married couples.258 This abstraction allowed equal protection to
perform the constitutional task of invalidating the restriction; privacy
doctrine need not be used to explain why unmarried couples were
entitled to liberty.259 Thus, the Court did not need to attack the law
for failing to value personal moral choices and intimate relations.
Traditional values were accepted. Status, not intimacy, remained as
the foundation for the protection of reproductive decisionmak-
ing.260
The end of Justice Brennan's opinion, however, sought to widen
the privacy base to include personal choices about reproduction and
spirituality.261 This could have made personal moral agency and
spiritual direction basic to the reasoning behind privacy rights. Un-
fortunately, little in the premises of privacy law has changed since
this opinion, 262 despitejustice Douglas' concurrence:
Our system of government requires that we have faith in the ability
of the individual to decide wisely, if only he [or she] is fully ap-
prised of the merits of a controversy. 2 6
3
This call for spiritual personhood, moral agency, and respect has
gone unheeded.2 64  Privacy law has been propelled forward by an
emphasis upon power, control, autonomy as state-exclusion, and
family.
Now, the Court questions whether any status is functionally similar
258. Eisenstad4 405 U.S. at450.
259. The asserted state bases for outlawing contraception-preserving health and morals by
discouraging non-marital intercourse-were seen as either farcical (why was fornication a 90-day
misdemeanor and contraceptive distribution a 5-year felony), id. at 449, or wildly unsuited to
those goals: an unwanted child is questionable punishment for premarital sex. Id at 452-53.
(Unwanted pregnancy visits the "punishment" upon the female, indicating the social disap-
proval of her conduct and that the fertility control is more importantly exercised against the
female rather than the male.) Adultery was possible with contraceptives available. Id. at 449.
260. Id. at 466.
261.405 U.S. at 453.
[The marital couple is notan independent entity ... butan association of two in-
dividuals with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. at 453.
262. However, the Joint Opinion ofJustices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Casey does
address the moral and spiritual nature of the woman's decision to abort, perhaps signaling a
reemergence of these themes. What is disturbing in Casey is that the recognition that abortion
poses a moral choice is not accompanied by a recognition that moral reasoning supports choos-
ing to abort as well as not to abort. Casey also fails to recognize that the range of moral choice
involved in procreation should be within a protected enclave for liberty.
263. 405 U.S. at457 (DouglasJ., concurring).
264. Contrast this reasoning with that in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), which held
that Congress could compel health care providers not to provide information that abortion is an
option for an unwanted pregnancy.
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to being "married." With Bowers v. Hardwick265 the Court success-
fully separated reproduction, marriage and family from sexuality, in-
timacy, and private choices. Being let alone266 does not protect one
from invasion into nonmarital bedrooms. In Bowers, a homosexual
male sought privacy protection from criminal prosecution for his
moral choice to engage in an individual, intimate, consensual, and
sexual relationship within his own bedroom.2 67 The Justices' opin-
ions are a daring expos6 of what privacy law was really all about. For
the Court, Justice White painstakingly details that privacy is about
family and children, and thus, of course, not about sexuality.268 The
reversion to status is complete. Social roles which do not fit the
model of the marital family are not only unprotected, they are rightly
the subject of "ancient" and universal prejudice.269
The opinion explicitly elevates the power of majoritarian morality
over personal moral choice.2 70 It is filled with disrespect for the in-
timate choices and relationships that fail to meet the dominant
paradigm, equating homosexual relationships with the violences of
incest and sex crimes carried out in the shelter of the bedroom.27 1
Chief Justice Burger goes further in concurrence, citing "ancient" at-
titudes treating homosexuality as a "'deeper malignity' than
rape."272 He admits that the real issue is one notjust of moral tradi-
tion, but of authorit,.273 Violence against women and children is not
as upsetting as homosexuality because it does not threaten authority,
265. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
266. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(asserting that being let alone is the right most valued by civilized men); accord Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that private possession of illegal pornographic materials can-
not be prohibited); accord Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discussing the right to
privacy as it pertains to contraception).
267. 478 U.S. at 189. Even if one believes Mr. Hardwick made an immoral choice, the ques-
tion of how to act was one involving a moral choice. One cannot protect moral choice without
protecting differing decisions.
268. Id. at 191.
269. Id. at 192.
270. d. at 194-95.
271. Id. at 195-98.
272. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (BurgerJ., concurring). What this says about choice in sexual
encounters, especially female choice, is not encouraging. Clearly, choice is less important than
gender role conformity. Indeed, Georgia punished sodomy as a crime short only of murder,
ranking it as worse than most violence and enforcing it against gays only. . at 196. What vio-
lence does homosexual conduct cause, other than challenging existing social roles? That is ap-
parently the ultimate violence, as it substitutes intimate relationship for majoritarian power and
control. Id. at 196-97 (Burgerj., concurring).
273. rd. at 197 (Burgerj., concurring).
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existing power relations, or gender roles. 274 Morality becomes sim-
ply a matter for authoritarian choice, given to society instead of to
the individual.275 In Bowers, moral autonomy and autonomy as free-
dom from state interference diverge from each other and from sexu-
ality, leaving autonomy, reproduction, and moral agency in a notably
uncomfortable relationship with each other.2 76
A privacy that protects reproduction but not sexuality is peculiar.
A privacy that protects reproduction but not non-majoritarian moral
choice is illusory. Such a privacy enforces a split between meaningful
moral autonomy2 77 and protection from State coercion. 278  It rec-
ognizes no claim to power or respect for private decisions of which
the State does not approve. It fails to protect relationships and de-
nies room for personal choice. Privacy and disrespect for private
moral choice coexist in Bowers, just as privacy and preservation of
traditional power and control in family relationships coexist in Meyer
and its progeny.
Justice Blackmun's dissent painfully acknowledges that the Court
is bowing to an obsession 27 9 to control different moral choices and
exerting social power in lieu of recognizing the "moral fact a person
belongs to [him or her]self. 280 In this context, he sees that privacy
should truly rest upon intimacy: self-definition individually, as well as
274. Cf. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WISC. L REV. 187,
187 (1988) (arguing that those who oppose homosexuality see it as a violation of gender norms,
and favor traditional concepts and structures of male/female relations).
275. Indeed, this is a peculiar construct, assigning the role of moral agency to society and
law as institutions rather than to individuals. As several ethics theorists have noted, only per-
sons, and not institutions, can be moral agents. Eg., NODDNGS, supra note 34, at 103; Edmund
Pincoffs, Membership Decisions and the Limits of Moral Obligation, inABORnION: Nrv DIRECrTONS
FOR PoLICY STUDIES 31, 34-35 (Edward Manier, William Liu & David Solomon eds., 1977). As-
signing moral agency to law is simply another way of exerting control and power over what
would othewise be moral decisions. David AJ. Richards, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Constitu-
tional Law: Prolegomenon to a Theorj of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 51 LAW & CONTFPM.
PROBS. 123, 130 (1988); Stephen Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Touble with
LawBased Conctions ofEthics, 68 IND. LJ. 101, 104-06, 124 (1992); cf Churchill & Simdn, supra
note 206, at 9. Legally requiring certain conduct makes the choice one of law, not morals. See
generally Salbu, supra (contrasting questions of law with questions of ethics).
276. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
277. That is, moral autonomy to choose conduct and beliefs that are not consistent with a
pre-designated and traditional definition of what is socially accepted as normal and moral.
278. Homosexuality blatantly challenges sexuality as male-female. Given the refusal to rec-
ognize it as protected within privacy, homosexuality must challenge power as well. If so, male-
female sexuality appears to be based upon male domination and powerjust as MacKinnon has
claimed, to uproarious dismay. See Catharine MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance. On Sex Dis-
eiminaion, in FEMNI UNMODFIED 32 (1987); CATHARIE MACmRNON, TOWARD A EMIN1ST
THEORYOFTHE STATE (1989) (analyzing social power between men andwomen).
279. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,777 (1986)).
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within chosen relationships and group affiliations. His opinion rec-
ognizes that the Court uses rights analysis to isolate and minimize
persons and their interests,281 and to view people in a vacuum, iso-
lated from the bonds created with others in forming their identities,
their lives, and their pursuit of happiness through "emotional en-
richment from close ties with others."2 82 Only after understanding
the core necessity of these chosen relationships can it make much
sense to view the individual in his or her relationship with and obli-
gations to society as a whole.
The Court's privacy jurisprudence both isolates the individual and
pits his or her moral choices against those of the society. The Court
had already failed to put "the significance of [humanity's] spiritual
nature ... feelings and ... intellect"283 at the core of privacy rights.
'With Bowers, it abandoned the alternative core it had developed-
protection in the bedroom.284 As Justice Stevens noted in his dis-
sent, the source of the privacy right in the Bowers analysis is control:
control exercised over people to "produce legitimate offspring."285
This control, this power to disrespect personal moral choice and
to destroy intimate296 relationships, is exercised in the name of pri-
vacy analysis. Privacy analysis, developed upon a foundation of coer-
cive power and control, has left pre-existing power relations within
the family untouched. Those relations have been viewed as sacro-
sanct, because the act of "normal" sex could mystically cause the
condition which enabled a woman to fulfill her destiny by becoming
an actual, notjust a potential, mother.
IV. CONCLUSION
PRIVACYWITH DISRESPECT: WOMEN AS REPRODUCERS BUT NOT
MORAL AGENTS
In the abortion cases, these themes of women as reproducers and
noncompetent moral decisionmakers287 converge with those of state
281. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
282. I& at 205 (BlackmunJ., dissenting). Blackmun observes that liberalism's rights, as in-
terpreted by the Court, are atomistic and self-regarding. Thus, Linda McClain's defense of
modem liberalism as theorized by Rawls and Dworkin is inapt, failing to evaluate the effect that
Supreme Court privacy doctrine has had upon the characterization and popular perception of
those rights and their holders. Cf. McClain, supra note 206, at 1171.
283. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 207 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
284. Id at 187; see text supra.
285. Id. at 215 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 214 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
287. See discussion supra Part II.
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power and personal dominion.2 88 The lack of respect for both
women and individual moral choice 289 merge and are incorporated
into abortionjurisprudence. These themes serve as foundations and
emerge in forms reflective of the explicit roles of female reproduc-
tion and decisionmaking in procreative choice.
The privacy cases form the legal foundation, while the attitude to-
wards women affects the application of the law of privacy. The law of
privacy controls the use of State power within accepted parameters
rather than giving power to individuals in matters of personal and
relational intimacy. Thus reproduction is protected not because of
its special quality as a moral choice within intimate relationships, but
because of its connection to traditional social roles, which are "let
alone" to be self-generating. 290 When the choices fit socially accept-
able roles, they may be protected, but when those intimate relational
choices challenge social roles, they are vituperously rejected. 291
Coupled with an underlying attitude that women should be mothers
and cannot be trusted to make significant decisions, protecting a
woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy as a core privacy interest
becomes oxymoronic.
In privacy law, when a choice does not match societal standards,
the choice is labeled as immoral. By so choosing, the decisionmaker
has demonstrated his or her incapacity to choose or to be trusted to
choose. Thus, what should be a constitutional protection of means--
the making of a deeply personal decision-becomes a legal rejection
because the ends are socially unacceptable. We have a constitutional
protection of liberty that protects each person's right to choose what
the society wants him or her to choose. Privacy is bought at the price
of conformity.
The privacy principle was also based upon a social and legal em-
barrassment as an effort to avert our collective gaze from male-
female sexuality and its reproductive consequences. In addition,
there was a belief that those consequences created a natural social
order in which women fulfilled a predestined maternal function.2 92
The law coped with this embarrassment and social predetermination
by applying an abstract principle of State noninterference in these
288. SosupraPartl (discussing privacy cases).
289. Individual moral choice exercised in contravention to traditional social expectations or
majotitarian beliefs is particularly susceptible to disrespect. Coupled with the distrust in privacy,
this disrespect can be fatal to according rights to people to act in ways that offend traditional
views of women and the family.
290. Seesupranotes 156-230 and accompanying text.
291. Se. e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94.
292. Eg., Siegel, supra note 9, at 274, 291-92, 300-04, 831.
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arenas. To describe the principle, the Court formulated the Meyer293
and Griswold lists.294 As an abstract principle, privacy could then be
extended to its logical limits and used to prohibit state interference
into the "most basic decisions about family and parenthood ... as
well as bodily integrity."295 As Roe pointed out, the principle clearly
extended to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, and child rearing and education [and] is broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy."29 6
While the extension makes sense, covering as it does decisions
flowing from sex and reproduction, its application to abortion vio-
lated two of its hidden premises: the premise that women have as-
signed social roles (especially in reproduction) and the premise that
privacy protects existing norms and power, not individual choice.
The extension has thus proven fragile. By freeing women to make
the very decisions that the culture had made for them, Roe trans-
ferred the power from the culture to the woman. The law of privacy
had formed a protected enclave for the exercise of power.2 97 But af-
ter Roe, the power holder became the woman, who could use it to al-
ter the traditional power structure in the private sphere. A system
that protected traditional distributions of power became a system
within which power can be exercised in ways that will fundamentally
293. Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
294. Grisvoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,488 (1965).
295. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,849 (1992).
296. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152-53 (1973) (citations omitted).
297. Taub & Schneider, supra note 112, at 117; Polan, supra note 112, at 294.
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affect the structure of the family, society and the "public" world.298
This consequence is diametrically opposed to the initial justification
for state noninterference, i.e., the preservation of the traditional
family and protection of the power of control over children.
Using such a privacy doctrine to define the legal response to the
issues of reproduction creates an unsuitable environment for pro-
tecting moral decisionmaling. The doctrine forms a basis for nour-
ishing traditional social and sexual roles.2 9 9 Its focus upon authoriz-
ing control to foster those values provides little helpful framework
for optimizing moral decisionmaling along the entire continuum of
available alternatives. To foster moral decisionmaking, we should es-
chew a framework that relies upon the physical dimensions of
authority and control (analogized to property interests) as political
constructs. Instead, we need a framework with the spiritual dimen-
sion of intimacy and respect to create an ethical domain in which re-
sponsibility (not control) will be exercised. We need to protect deci-
sions, not dominion.
In abstract legal terms, the extension of a right of privacy that en-
compasses decisions about marriage and family3 00 to an obviously
reproductive decision such as abortion is not surprising or difficult.
But the use of that right to provide the very mechanism-female
control over a particular reproductive event-that undercuts pi-
298. The Caseyjoint opinion recognized just this effect of Roe. The fact that women have
always endured the constraints of childbirth and childrearing is not alone "grounds for the state
to insist... upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that version has been in
the course of our history and our culture." Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. "The ability of women to par-
ticipate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability
to control their reproductive lives." Id. at 855. See also EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 183-84
(stating that Roegave women power over their bodies, making them less "differente with respect
to sexual freedom and wage-earning; this upset "'a complicated set of assumptions about who
women were, what their roles in life should be, what kinds ofjobs they should take in the paid
labor force, and how those jobs should be awarded.'") (citing KYIS EN LUKER, ABORTION AND
THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984));J. Williams, Gender Wars, sup-a note 7, at 1559, 1587
(noting that the equality women gained with the abortion right is seen as a threat to the social
order in the sex role context); Hem, supra note 17, at 127; cf GEL & PALLE, supra note 17, at
85, 129 (observing that political change benefiting women is least acceptable when it alters
women's core social roles; abortion changed such roles and placed power relations at stake, thus
explaining the continued opposition to that policy); Schnably, supra note 8, at 715, 839-40
(noting that much of the social reaction to women's control over their fertility has been to de-
velop ways which remove that control, for example, with contraceptive methods such as Nor-
plant and with forced sterilization); Schnably, supra note 8, at 845 (remarking that the struggle
over reproductive rights comes down to disagreements over sex roles and family structures, over
the vision of women in control versus women as natural mothers).
299. Indeed, one pro-life scholar opines that the only acceptable liberty rights are those
which derive from traditional sex roles and family structures. Smolin, supra note 250, at 621. e
also Schnably, supra note 10, at 875.
800. These decisions include Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977)
(begetting and bearing children), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(raising children).
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vacy's premise of the femAle as a passive performer of a maternal role
without economic or political power is likely to produce great confu-
sion, upheaval, and continuous attempts to remove it or alter its ef-
fectiveness.3 01 It is the principle and its anachronistic premises
which are on collision courses with each other.3 02 The primary
problems of abortion jurisprudence are attributable more to this re-
ality than they are to an alleged lack of legal or moral premises to
explain why the decisions about procreation are properly placed in a
zone free of state interference.
Once we see the unacceptable premises that infect the jurispru-
dence of reproductive choice, we can recognize them at work in the
abortion cases, and identify the problems and errors they have cre-
ated in abortion doctrine and discourse. These are the first steps to-
ward eliminating the premises of disrespect for women, the assump-
tions that women are morally responsible only when fulfilling
traditional expectations of the mother-role, and the beliefs that
women cannot and do not make trustworthy decisions of significant
moral import. When these faulty premises are purged, we face the
opportunity to use better premises in formulating our jurisprudence
of liberty and choice. With those premises, we can imagine and con-
301. Many scholarlystudies of the members of the pro-choice and pro-life movements estab-
lish that at its core, a great deal of the disagreement arises from attitudes about women,
women's roles, and family structure. It is important to note that these attitudes are not univer-
sal, and not strictly divided according to identity with either side of the debate. They are also
not the only reasons behind a person's position with respect to abortion. GINSBURG, supra note
48, at 139-45, 169-70, 194-97 (reporting that her anthropological study in Fargo, North Dakota,
of members of both camps reveals that pro-life activists identify more with the values of
"domesticity," whereas pro-choice activists see women as autonomous people with an interest in
pursuing self-development through careers as well); LUKER, supra note 48, at 176 (detailing a
sociological study of California activists that shows pro-life women as committed to "traditional"
views of women's roles as wives and mothers, whereas pro-choice activists are more career-
oriented); Blake, supra note 48, at 447 (noting how conservative views of the family, gender
roles, and sexuality explain much anti-abortion morality); SHEERAN, supra note 8, at 125-28, 131
(asserting that much of the difference between pro-life and pro-choice advocates is their view
about women's roles and changing them); EISENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 126, 154, 184
(explaining that views on the family, gender roles within the family, and sexuality separate pro-
life from pro-choice adherents); GLE & PALLTE, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that the threat
abortion rights pose to traditional values of family and sex roles explains the opposition to
them);J. Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 7, at 1580-83 (stating that the rhetoric of pro-choice
and pro-life adherents accentuates that they differ markedly in their views of women's roles in
the family and the workplace); Siegel, supra note 9, at 328 (stating that the differing views of
women's role as "mothers" is a key to the abortion debate); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, at 91
(discussing that traditional views about sex roles characterize many pro-life adherents); Shan-
non, supra note 17, at 3, 8 (noting that critical factors in abortion positions are attitudes about
childrearing and social practices, as well as one's education and class).
302. Cf. Justice O'Connor's contention that medical technology stretching the time of fetal
viability back further into gestation puts the Roe trimester framework (setting viability as the
point where State interest in fetal life can outweigh the woman's choice) on a "collision course
with itself." Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,458 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
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struct a doctrine of liberty and a mode of discourse that will move us
closer to solutions. Our work has begun. Let it continue.

